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ÖZET: 
Bu tez sinemayı estetik bağlamda şu soru ile analiz edecek: Sinema sanatı 
içinde güzel  nasıl yaratılmıştır? Alman filozof Immanuel Kant’ın (1724 – 1804) estetik 
yargı teorisi bu analizdeki aksiyom olacak.  Fakat, Kant’dan bağımsız olarak estetik 
yargının objenin kaynağıyla direk ilişki içinde olduğunu savunacağım. Bu nedenle 
sinemanın estetiğini tanımlamak için sinema konusuna, ontolojik açıdan yaklaşacağım. 
Sinemanın estetiğini anlamak ve güzelin bunun içinde nasıl yaratıldığını keşfetmek için 
sinemanın kaynağını araştıracağım.   Bunu bulmak için de, sinematografik-imge sinema 
sanatındaki en küçük birim olduğundan ve kaynağın bu en küçük birimde belirgin 
olacağından, sinematografik-imgenin keşfi ve ontik ilkesi yoluyla sinematografik-
imgenin kaynağını araştıracağım.  Bu kaynağın zaman olduğu ortaya çıkacak ve insan 
aklına bağlantısı bakımından zaman kavramını inceleyeceğım. İnceleme sonunda, 
sinemanın kaynağındaki zaman kavramının Henri-Louis Bergson’un (1859 – 1941) süre 
kavramı olduğu anlaşılacak. Ardından sinemaya tekrar döneceğim ve sinematografik-
imgeyi bir kez daha, doğası ve yapısı bakımından analiz edeceğim.  Ayrıca 
sinematrografik-imge ile sinema arasındaki bağlantıyı farklı sinematik eğilimlerle 
anlamaya çalışacağım.  Bu son bölüme öncülük edecek ve burda sinematik estetiği 
açıklayacağım.  Sonuç olarak da bu tez şunu önerecek, sinemadaki estetik; zaman 
estetiğidir. 
 
  4 
ABSTRACT: 
This dissertation will analyze cinema in the context of aesthetics by simply asking the 
question: How is beautiful created in the work of the art of cinema? German philosopher 
Immanuel Kant’s theory of aesthetic judgment will be the axiom to explore this. 
However, independently of Kant, I will argue that aesthetic judgment is in direct relation 
to the origin of the object. Therefore I will follow an ontological approach to the subject 
of cinema to define its aesthetics. In order to understand its aesthetics and to discover 
how beautiful is created in it, I will search for the origin of cinema. Since 
cinematographic-image is the smallest unit of the work of the art of cinema and the origin 
will be evident in it, through its invention and ontic principle I will investigate the origin 
of cinematographic-image to find out the origin of cinema. This will expose, as time and 
I will inquire the concept of time, in regard to its relation to human mind. The kind of 
time concept that is in the origin of cinema will disclose as Henri-Louis Bergson’s 
concept of duration. Then I will turn back to cinema and analyze cinematographic-image 
once more through its nature and structure. I will also try to understand the relation of 
cinematographic-image and cinema through different cinematic impulses. This will lead 
to the last chapter, where I will elucidate the aesthetics of cinema. As the conclusion this 
dissertation will propose that the aesthetics in cinema is the aesthetics of time.  
 
 
 
  5 
CONTENTS 
 0. INTRODUCTION………………………………………………………….….........7 
  0.1. KANT’S CONCEPT OF BEAUTIFUL……………………………………..12 
  0.2. WHERE DO WE LOOK FOR BEAUTIFUL IN CINEMA?................................20 
 1. THE ORIGIN OF CINEMA…………………………………………….…………..24 
  1.1. INVENTION OF THE CINEMATOGRAPHIC-IMAGE………………............24 
  1.2. ONTIC PRINCIPLE OF THE CINEMATOGRAPHIC-IMAGE…….…………..28 
 2. THE CONCEPT OF TIME……………………………………………...………….33 
  2.1. OBJECTIVE TIME…………..………………………………….............33 
  2.2. SUBJECTIVE TIME…………………….....……………………………41 
   2.2.1. AUGUSTINE’S ACCOUNT OF TIME…………………………..41 
   2.2.2. KANT’S ACCOUNT OF TIME…………...……….……............45 
  2.3. DURATION-TEMPORAL SUBJECTIVITY…………….……...…...…........50 
 3. THE CINEMATOGRAPHIC-IMAGE………….…………….……..………..............58 
  3.1. THE NATURE OF THE CINEMATOGRAPHIC-IMAGE……...………...........58 
  3.2. THE STRUCTURE OF THE CINEMATOGRAPHIC-IMAGE……...………….72 
  3.3. CINEMATIC IMPULSES AND THE CINEMATOGRAPHIC-IMAGE..…...........81 
   3.3.1. CLASSICAL FORM……….....……….....................................85 
   3.3.2. MODERN FORM…………………..........................................91 
 4. AESTHETICS OF CINEMA………………..………...………...............................101 
  4.1. IDEAS OF BEAUTY IN CINEMA……...……………………..................103 
  4.2. CINEMA: AESTHETICS OF TIME…………………...………………….110 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY………………………………….……………………………….117 
  6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CINEMA: AESTHETICS OF TIME 
 
 
 
“Time becomes the very foundation of cinema: as sound is in music, 
color in painting, character in drama.”1 
 
Andrey Tarkovsky 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
1 Tarkovsky, Andrey. Sculpting In Time. Hunter‐Blair, Kitty. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2003. p. 119 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0. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
“The beautiful is that which apart from concepts  
is represented as the object of a universal satisfaction.” 2                                 
Immanuel Kant 
 
 
Cinema is the practice of signs and images either on analytic or on aesthetic ground. 
If one wants to understand what cinema is, questioning what cinema expresses within its 
context won’t help him much. Since cinema appears as an artistic phenomenon, then only 
understanding aesthetics of cinema can help us to understand what cinema is. Thus, this 
dissertation analyzes cinema in the context of aesthetics by simply asking the following 
question: How is beautiful created in the work of the art of cinema?  
Aesthetics is the philosophical inquiry into art and beauty. Such an inquiry tries to 
disclose how we aesthetically value an object through its aesthetic properties, aesthetic 
experiences and aesthetic judgments. In terms of aesthetic properties and aesthetic 
experiences, both are in connection to aesthetic judgment, because while the former one 
ascribes aesthetic judgments, the latter one grounds them. On the other hand aesthetic 
judgment determines the aesthetic value of the object, i.e. defines whether it is beautiful 
or not. If aesthetic judgment is in the center of aesthetic philosophy, then we should 
analyze the aesthetics of cinema in terms of aesthetic judgment and find out how 
beautiful is created in cinema.  
German philosopher Immanuel Kant’s (1724 – 1804) theory of aesthetic judgment 
will be our axiom to explore the aesthetics of cinema. Kant’s aesthetic philosophy 
investigates the nature of such judgment, regardless of what the image expresses. 
Therefore, this approach proves to be an effective tool for the analysis of the aesthetics of                                                         
2 Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Judgment. Bernard, J. H. New York: Barnes & Noble Books, 2005 p. 10 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cinema, even though Kant did not—and could not—have in mind the “moving pictures”. 
Kant’s definition of beautiful is not related to the judgment that occurs following a 
cognitive decipher, but rather to an immediate and disinterested affection.  
According to Kant, the aesthetic value of an object is far from being attributed to the 
object itself, instead the object reflects such value as the free play of imagination. This 
internal process is an intuitive and a subjective process. However, the judgment of beauty 
should be universally valid. Such validity does not show that everyone agrees on the 
same aesthetic judgment, but rather it shows that they ought to agree on, i.e. beautiful 
ought to be the same for everyone. In other words, since the non-cognitive judgment of 
aesthetic beauty through the free play of imagination works as affection and upon our 
feelings, it seems to occur without any rule. On the other hand, this process ends up with 
a universally valid judgment, which requires that everyone ought to see the same beauty. 
In short, aesthetic judgment occurs without any rule but in a rule governed way. We 
cannot show proof to our judgment, but intuitively and through our feelings we can 
justify it. In this sense the judgment can only take itself as the law and the aesthetic value 
relates to the subject more than anything: 
If pleasure is bound up with the mere apprehension of the form of an object of intuition, 
without reference to a concept for a definite cognition, then the representation is thereby 
not referred to the Object, but simply to the subject, and the pleasure can express 
nothing else than its harmony with the cognitive faculties which come into play in the 
reflective Judgment, and so far as they are in play; and hence can only express a 
subjective formal purposiveness of the Object.3  
This purposiveness rests on the immediate pleasure in the form of the object in the 
mere reflection upon it, and it is relative to the subject. It means that the object of art can 
                                                        
3 Ibid., p. 38 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only called purposive, when its representation is immediately combined with the feeling 
of pleasure. That’s why beautiful is the purposiveness of the object.  
Obtaining this purposiveness and having an aesthetic judgment based upon it means, 
in the case of cinema, that the work is reflected and related to one’s feelings in such a 
way that the core of cinema is intrinsically revealed, grasped and implemented, in short 
experienced by him. This core, whatever that makes cinema a unique form of art, and 
each movie a singular example of the aesthetic effort based on that form, cannot not be a 
posteriorly attributed property of cinema: it should constitute and contain the essence of 
cinema—an essence incorporating its origin, that is, the source and point at which cinema 
comes into existence, including the conditions of possibility for a movie to be conceived 
as a work of art are determined and satisfied, which in turn gives cinema the order of its 
being.  
In terms of the object of art, the origin of the artistic form is the origin of the object as 
well. The origin, without any connection to the subject, appears within the art object, but 
not as a kind of substance, instead as its ontic principle that governs the art object. In a 
way it is a metaphysical origin. This metaphysical origin is to be sought in the underlying 
nature and reality of cinema as an art form in such a way as to bring forth the critical 
element, which enables cinema to exist and convey meaning as a distinct and unique 
narrative. This purposive manifestation of the origin in the form of the cinematic work of 
art, one’s mere reflection upon it, triggers aesthetic communication between the art object 
and the subject and gives positive satisfaction. When this happens, the aesthetic value 
directly represents the origin of it. Then to understand the aesthetics of cinema and to 
discover how beautiful is created in it, we need to find out its origin.  
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Therefore we will follow an ontological approach to the subject of cinema to define 
its aesthetics and find out the ontic principle, the metaphysical origin that governs it. This 
origin should reside and be evident in its smallest unit, i.e. in the cinematographic-image. 
Thus, in the first chapter, to discover the origin of cinema, we will try to understand what 
the cinematographic-image consists of. In order to understand and explain the process in 
which the cinematographic-image emerges, we need to explain how cinema is made 
possible and structured by its ontic principle in such a way as to contain, manifest and 
exhibit its origin. It is because of this, we need to start with the question “how the idea of 
capturing motion was developed?” and conclude the analysis with an exposition of “what 
does the ontic principle of that artistic form consist of?”  
In the following chapter, the origin of cinema as an art form will be discussed and 
disclosed as time. In the second chapter the concept of time will be examined with regard 
to its relation to the mind. The elaboration concerning the question whether time is an 
objective or a subjective phenomenon, will lead to the conclusion that the notion of time 
inherent to the origin of cinema seems to echo French philosopher Henri-Louis Bergson’s 
(1859 – 1941) concept of duration, which is defined as temporal subjectivity constituting 
a metaphysical entity, not an empirical reality.  
In the third chapter we will investigate the cinematographic-image itself to see 
whether the origin, duration, manifests itself in the cinematographic-image. Thus, we 
will try to understand the nature and structure of the cinematographic-image, through 
which the cinematographic-image offers an immediate perception of the universe: it 
opens up another point of view, where we can see “in motion”.  However, this perception 
differs from our empirical perception in such a manner that we can view not just the 
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illusion of motion, but also the real-motion. If the origin of the cinematographic-image is 
duration, then real alteration as duration in the cinematographic-image should be a 
metaphysical kind as well. Unlike the time of a clock, alterations in duration are not 
quantitative but rather qualitative. Therefore the perception that the cinematographic-
image offers as its nature is an alternative to our empirical perception.  
With the cinematographic-image we experience time as Bergson’s concept of 
duration and its structure also reflects this temporal subjectivity. The way the 
cinematographic-image communicates time (duration) to the viewer (the subject) opens 
up a new subjectivity that arises when the object (the image) and subject become one. 
Such process occurs as the cycling interpretation of the image by the subject and 
interpretation of the subject by the image. This process reflects Pierce’s triad semiotics 
but also displays the heterogeneousity of duration, which is in the image.   
However, this only shows us the relation between real-time/duration and the 
cinematographic-image/ artistic form but it does not necessarily prove any relation 
between cinema/the work of art and real-time/duration. Therefore, in the third chapter we 
will also question how this temporal subjectivity of the cinematographic-image manifests 
itself in a film, or whether it can do it at all. We will see that it is possible to for a film not 
to accommodate temporal subjectivity as it manifests organizing principle, but these 
works/cases do not create an alternative perception of time. Juxtaposing images to create 
the cinematic work of art brings a critical hindrance: the perception of space, which is an 
empirical one, impedes the communication of the cinematographic image’s perception of 
time as temporal subjectivity. 
  12 
In the last chapter, we will define the cinematic beautiful in the way described above 
and inquire whether such a thing exists within the accepted notions of cinema. Those 
notions include various ideas of beauty, according which a movie is labeled beautiful. 
Finally it will be argued that beautiful in cinema is experienced as the free play of 
imagination, but only if cinema can reflect the origin of the cinematographic-image. In 
this case time will appear as the apprehension of the object, which is reflected to our 
feelings and immediately pleases us without any concept or purpose. In cases otherwise, 
namely, when a film does not reflect the origin of the cinematographic-image, we are not 
necessarily watching a bad movie or anything ugly, however due to other evaluations, the 
judgment concerning that movie can’t be an aesthetic one, but only about its goodness: 
the work can be good for something else or good in itself. Such works still use the same 
artistic form and the same practice of signs and images but that does not necessarily mean 
its aesthetic value is of a cinematic kind, if there is an aesthetic judgment at all.  
This dissertation will ultimately emphasizes that the kind of cinema that aims to 
present temporal subjectivity creates aesthetic judgment. In this kind of cinema, time 
(duration) appears as its aesthetic value, i.e. the beautiful. In the light of these 
considerations, this dissertation will conclude by proposing that the aesthetics in cinema 
is the aesthetics of time. 
0.1. KANT’S CONCEPT OF BEAUTIFUL  
According to Kant, the faculty of judgment is the faculty for thinking the particular 
under the universal, which means that one can reach universal judgment via single 
incident or an object. Kant argues that judgment stands between the legislation of 
understanding and the legislation of reasoning. All three appear in the faculty of 
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knowledge, which is cognitive. In fact, in the Critique of Pure Reason, understanding, 
judgment and imagination are Kant’s “schematism” of concepts. In the account of Kant, 
judgments can be either determined or reflective. In the case of “schematism” of 
concepts, judgment is determined. This role subsumes particulars under concepts or 
universals, which are already given. If that is the case, then judgment cannot operate as 
an independent faculty separate from understanding. Kant, in the Critique of Judgment, 
points out that  
If the universal (the rule, the principle, the law) is given, then judgment, which 
subsumes the particular under it is determining. But if only the particular is given, for 
which the universal has to be found, the judgment is merely reflecting.4 
Thus, in his third critique, judgment has a more discrete function: the capacity to 
reflect. Reflective judgments find the universal for a given particular. Thus it only takes 
itself as law. Such judgments are “pure”, while determined judgments fail to be pure. In 
terms of aesthetics, Kant mostly deals with pure judgments, but he also argues that most 
judgments about art fail to be pure.  
Judgments of beauty fail to be pure if they are influenced by the object’s sensory or 
emotional appeal. In this case the beauty would be dependent on the object’s existence. In 
such situations, the object is judged as beautiful because it belongs to this or that kind. 
Kant suggests that all judgments of beauty about fine arts, which are valued through the 
cultural codes, are judgments of dependent beauty rather than of free beauty. They are 
impure. According to this, non-representational formative arts such as painting, sculpture 
or architecture, for which design is essential, and all music without a text, can cause a 
pure, thus aesthetic judgment. In this sense it is the pure judgment of beauty that gives us 
beautiful.                                                          
4 Ibid., p. 32 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In the “Analytic of the Beautiful” with which the “Critique of Aesthetic Judgment” 
begins, Kant tries to capture what is distinctive about the judgments of beauty. He starts 
by citing that judgments on beauty are always based on feelings. But feeling is not 
something sensational, rather it is the feeling of pleasure. Kant also emphasizes that the 
kind of pleasure we gain as the result of encountering an art object should be 
disinterested.  If the pleasure is bound up with interest, then it happens depending on the 
existence or non-existence of the object. Such satisfaction or dissatisfaction of the 
existence of an object occurs in the faculty of desire, which is a cognitive faculty.  
If the judgment is bound up with interest, then the judgment would be agreeable, 
either as good or pleasant. Agreeable judgments are the kind of judgments, which are 
expressed by simply stating that one likes something or finds it pleasing, thus gratifying 
us. Judgments on the agreeable, such as pleasant, please our senses in sensation. It’s the 
sensation of the object that happens in relation to its existence, thus it is objective because 
sense is something we understand through cognitive faculties (lovely, enjoyable, etc.).  If 
the judgment were based on objective sensation such as the color of the object, this would 
be a cognitive judgment. This judgment would solely be based on the empirical 
perception of the object, e.g. the object is blue. Good on the other hand, can be something 
good in itself or good for something else. A judgment like good is about the moral 
goodness of something and about its goodness for particular non-moral ends.  
In the case of beautiful, judgment occurs differently, which is a pure aesthetic 
judgment. Such judgment is bound up with disinterested pleasure. Unlike interested 
pleasure, it does not depend on the subject having a desire for the object, nor does it 
generate any desire. This character of disinterestedness distinguishes the aesthetic 
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judgment from other judgments, because it is solely based on feelings. The pleasure 
arises as a result of disinterested and immediate satisfaction or dissatisfaction of the 
object’s representation to our feelings, thus as a pure judgment.  
Within Kant’s aesthetic theory, such character also relates to the unintentional quality 
of purposiveness. Kant says that beauty is the form of purposiveness, which means that 
the object does not intend to have any purpose but unintentionally reflects an end. As we 
can see, the judgments on good or pleasant presuppose an end or purpose, which the 
object has to satisfy. An end is “the object of a concept, in so far as the concept is 
regarded as the cause of the object.”5 This means it has a purpose and it is the real ground 
of its possibility. Purposiveness, on the other hand, is “the causality of a concept in 
respect of its Object”6 and it is contingent. Thus the quality of purposiveness demands 
disinterested relation with the object.   
Disinterested judgment that determines beautiful is a pure aesthetic judgment and it is 
related to the faculty of taste. Taste is the faculty of judgment on the object of 
representation by satisfaction or dissatisfaction. The judgment of taste, which we use to 
decide whether the object is beautiful, should be pure, not empirical, because empirical 
judgments rely on cognitive faculties. It is, of course, inescapable that in order to grasp 
what beautiful is, the object should be in time and space within an empirical perception, 
but the judgment should be intuitive. We understand the satisfaction or dissatisfaction but 
we do not reason with it. Therefore the judgment of taste only occurs in the relation of the 
object to its representation through the feeling of pleasure or pain. It is not based on an 
objective sensation or any kind of goodness. That kind of judgment cannot be                                                         
5 Ibid., p. 19 
6 Ibid., p. 19 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determined, because there is no cognitive understanding of the object. In the end 
judgment of taste is mere intuition and reflection, and not an empirical judgment, thus it 
is subjective.  
If the judgment of taste is of an aesthetical kind, and is not cognitive, then the 
subject’s relation to the object cannot be defined with an analytic approach. If it is an 
intuitive phenomenon, the communication between the subject and the object should not 
happen as a result of a decision but rather as an immediate, pure affection. However, this 
subjective immediacy ought to be a universal judgment as well because the judgment on 
art is of a reflective kind: particular to universal. The universality of an aesthetic 
judgment does not mean that it is a judgment on generalities, because universal validity is 
different than taking a singular judgment and building a cognitive judgment upon it. For 
example, ‘The rose is pleasant’ is a sensual judgment and ‘Roses are good’ is a practical 
judgment. However, if you say ‘The rose is beautiful’ then that is an aesthetic judgment. 
On the other hand if you say ‘Roses are beautiful’, that is a cognitive judgment, since I 
come to that conclusion by taking the knowledge of an aesthetic judgment as a ground for 
the roses.  
If you come to a conclusion by taking anything as an example, that would be general 
and cognitive, since it relies on the existence of the object. It has nothing to do with the 
feeling of it, whereas aesthetic judgment has to be singular, subjectively universal and 
immediate. Generalizing from singular judgment is similar to exemplary validity and 
ideal. Ideal means that the representation is adequate to the idea.  Exemplary validity is 
the ideal norm, which can turn into a rule for everyone. If you come to a conclusion by 
taking anything as an example that is general and cognitive as well.  
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There are also no rules as universals by which someone can be compelled to judge 
that something is beautiful or prove the judgment on beauty. The reason for that is 
because universality with regard to aesthetic judgments is not something that is 
cognitively achieved or put in order. The universality of an aesthetic judgment is not 
based on concepts but rather appears as an automatic reflection. Such universality 
happens in a way that everyone ought to agree on the same aesthetic judgment, without 
any interest, as the immediate reflection. Namely, it does not drive from any kind of 
sumption; rather it occurs as affection and via feelings, purposively. If this is the case we 
cannot lay out a map to reach that judgment. We cannot define the process or reason with 
it.  Without any definite rule the judgment takes place but also there is something 
universal about aesthetic judgment, which requires a kind of law. The law of such 
judgment happens to be the lawfulness without a law, because the judgment can only take 
itself as the law. Which means that aesthetic judgment occurs without any rule but in a 
rule governed way. This is related to the process of aesthetic judgment, i.e. the free play 
of imagination.  
Kant describes beautiful as the free play of imagination, which happens within our 
faculties without any distinct order. This free play of imagination is about adapting the 
application of concepts to the objects, which are presented to our senses without any 
particular concept being applied. According to Kant, concepts correspond to rules due to 
our imagination, which synthesizes or organizes the data of sense perception. Therefore 
imagination functions without being governed by any rule or a law in particular but in a 
rule-governed way.7  
Kant’s depiction of the judgment of beauty as something “subjectively grounded” is                                                         
7 Kant, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant‐aesthetics/ 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objected and challenged that these judgments are actually nonetheless objective in the 
same sense that judgments on secondary properties of an object such as its color or shape 
are objective. According to this argument, the free play is no more than a manifestation 
of the object’s empirical perception. In fact, if we say that everyone ought to share the 
same perception of an object in regard to its secondary properties, then we must also say 
that everyone ought to share the same perception of the object in which our faculties are 
in free play cognitively. Thus, the judgment becomes objective and cognitive. However, 
Kant’s theory of aesthetics finds beautiful through disinterested and immediate relation of 
the subject with the object of the judgment: 
In order to distinguish whether anything is beautiful or not, we refer the representation 
not by the Understanding to the Object for cognition, but by the Imagination to the 
subject.8  
This imagination is in free play and it is the subjectivity of the judgment. Thus the 
concept of beauty is subjective, not in a way that the subject’s senses are affected, but 
rather how the subject can discover the object’s beauty and relate to it through the free 
play of imagination. In this sense Kant’s Aesthetic Judgment can only be possible not by 
revolving around the object to understand it analytically, but rather by going into the 
object intuitively.  
If we consider Kant’s aesthetic philosophy, the most common notion of an aesthetic 
judgment is beauty. As opposed to it there is no definition of ugly, furthermore he does 
not mention whether we can have an aesthetic judgment of ugly. According to Kant’s 
understanding of the term, aesthetic judgment only functions with pleasure. Therefore, he 
discusses beautiful in distinction to another aesthetic judgment, sublime. Sublime is the 
negative pleasure due to the greatness of the object. While sublime appears in art as                                                         
8 Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Judgment. Bernard, J. H. New York: Barnes & Noble Books, 2005 p. 3 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infinite and beyond concepts, which we are overwhelmed by, either by size or by force of 
fear, beautiful appears through the free play of imagination and as the positive pleasure. 
However, in the end beautiful and sublime are aesthetic judgments and what is not 
beautiful is not equal to sublime. In fact, we either have the aesthetic judgment or not.  
Opposed to the judgment on beautiful, Kant’s aesthetic theory offers the judgment on 
agreeable. This cognitive judgment can be on moral ends, as in good in itself or good for 
something. Or it can also be on pleasant in accordance with our interest. Therefore in 
Kant’s aesthetic theory, opposed to an aesthetic judgment, either in the case of beautiful 
or sublime, there is a cognitive judgment. Kant’s theory of beautiful “carves off aesthetic 
reflection from our mundane, pragmatic concerns, and shows why it is that a judgment of 
taste seems unable to be true or false”9. According to Kant, art is a unique and automatic 
reflection, which transmits as judgment.  
His theory defines beautiful as the reflection of the representation of an object to our 
feelings through the free play of imagination, which pleases us immediately without any 
concept or purpose. This process of imagination is the happening of beautiful, and due to 
its universality everyone ought to agree on the same aesthetic judgment of an object and 
share one’s pleasure in it. Kant himself does not argue on the existence of any relation 
between aesthetic judgment and the origin of the object, but purposiveness of the 
judgment refers to that kind of relation. As the causality of a concept in respect of its 
object, purposiveness rests on the immediate pleasure in the form of the object in the 
mere reflection upon it. The art object can be called as purposive, if only the 
representation of it can immediately combine with the feeling of pleasure. To achieve 
such purposive object and have an aesthetic judgment via it, the reflection of the object to                                                         
9 Ibid., p. xiii 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our feelings must relate to it without any interest. This disinterested relation to the object 
can only happen with something that governs the object’s way to be, and not with 
something that is a substantive property of the object. The origin does not mean the 
material or immaterial substance that conditions its being, but rather it is a metaphysical 
origin, which is to be sought in the underlying nature and reality of the object. This shows 
us that the object, in order to be beautiful, should reflect its origin to the subject through 
undetermined, automatic ways, through its nature.  
0.2. WHERE DO WE LOOK FOR BEAUTY IN CINEMA? 
From the above exposition of Kant’s aesthetic theory, it can be deduced that 
discovering what constitutes beauty in cinema-as-a-form-of art involves, in the first 
place, finding out what it is that pleases us immediately without any concept or purpose 
in cinema-as-a-work-of-art. In order to do that we need to investigate cinema in terms of 
its material(s) and form(s) peculiar to its nature, which hopefully will reveal cinema’s 
aesthetic value. Each field of art has its own specific kind of material and form, which, on 
their own terms, define the aesthetic value and concept of beauty unique to that field. In 
terms of image-based aesthetics, the basic artistic object comprising both the material and 
the form consist in the static, framed image and within the image the aesthetic value is 
revealed. For example, in photography the artistic form reveals the composition of light. 
It is true to say that colors and lines are also important, but again it is the light that 
communicates them in a photograph. The light draws the limits for them. Painting, on the 
other hand, it is the composition of color that creates the image and gives its aesthetic 
value. Arts such as music, which do not involve the articulation of an image, also have 
their own artistic form. Musical aesthetics is developed upon the dimensions of rhythmic 
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and harmonic organization, which reveals the artistic form as a simple composition. What 
is the specific artistic form of cinema; does it even have one?  
Italian film theorist Ricciotto Canudo (1879–1923) who labeled cinema “the seventh 
art” refers to cinema as “plastic art in motion”10. He believes that cinema is the inevitable 
end of prior art forms and is the combination of spatial and temporal arts. In fact, it is true 
that cinema can reflect all forms of art either temporal or spatial. Painting, photography, 
sculpture, etc. are all considered as spatial arts because they are permanent. On the other 
hand, there are temporal arts, which last as long as the medium lasts. Performance arts 
such as, dance, music, song and acting are temporal because they last until the performers 
stop.  
Which category does cinema belong to? The recorded image is permanent on film or 
in digital material, but it also ends when the tape, film rolls or downloaded data is 
finished. We can argue that since cinema is the combination of all forms of art, instead of 
a unique one, it can carry the marks of the aesthetic values of other forms of art. If so, 
then other artistic forms should justify cinematic beauty. However, if cinema does not 
have any artistic form or aesthetic value specific to its nature, then it cannot be accepted 
as the seventh art. If cinema is to be regarded an independent, autonomous form of art, 
one cannot define cinema solely on the basis of its connections to other forms of art. 
Cinema calls for its own aesthetic inquiry by its nature.  
Then what is cinema’s own artistic form that reveals its aesthetic value? If we take 
the previous chapter into account, in aesthetic judgments, the object reflects its origin as 
beautiful, which is far from being attributed to the object itself. Therefore, in order to find 
out how the art of cinema gains its aesthetic value, we first need to find the origin of it.                                                         
10 Stam, Robert. Film Theory: An Introduction. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Inc. 2000. p. 35 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The origin should be in its smallest unit, and beautiful should be created in that unit. 
What is that unit in cinema? Is it a frame, a shot or a scene? In physical reality, it is one 
single static picture, one of the “moving” 24 frames per second. On the other hand, this 
static shot has no cinematic communication at all. It is not different than any regular 
photograph and it does not contain movement. Yet still it is part of movement. Since we 
cannot reach the whole motion with one immobile part we cannot experience cinematic 
communication with a single frame. Then what is the smallest unit of cinema that can 
also cinematically communicate?  
If the cinematographic-image is not one single frame then it can be a shot, a scene or 
even the whole movie. The length of the image is not what matters, as long as it contains 
the origin. Movement is something fundamental for the cinematic practice. This means 
movement can be the determining element to draw the borders of units, but movement of 
what? What we see in these units of a movie (shot, scene, etc.) is determined due to the 
movement of the pictures, but also the camera view as the observer limits what is seen 
and draws the borders of the cinematographic-image. Film camera’s relation to its object 
is not a simple, plain recording. In a way, film camera does not solely record; it has the 
possibility of capturing the object’s higher degree of reality, because it observes the 
object in such a way that it re-creates its own object from the observed object. In 
determining the smallest unit of cinema that also contains its aesthetic origin, it is 
important to realize that the movement of the pictures is continuous throughout the movie 
but the point of views change, which may possibly define/redefine the units inherent to 
the work. This means the smallest part of cinema should be delineated primarily on the 
basis of the movement of the camera, the observer. When the camera starts to look and 
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ends the look, the borders of the cinematographic-image become determined. If the 
cinematographic-image is in such borders, then in a single shot the origin can manifest 
itself.  
It is from this image the art of cinema builds itself, which means it is also in and 
through this image that one witnesses the beautiful in cinema. For example photography 
is the art of still images. Still images reveal light as the origin of this spatial art, because 
their being depends on capturing light. Thus, if cinema is the art of the cinematographic-
image, then this artistic creation should disclose what the origin of cinema is. The origin 
becomes the material of the cinematographic-image and through the form it receives in 
the constitution of the cinematographic-image is also revealed as its aesthetic value. 
In conclusion, in order to find the origin of cinema, one needs to investigate the 
cinematographic-image. This metaphysical origin can be found within the underlying 
nature and reality of the cinematographic-image. The outer development of the 
cinematographic-image and its ontic principle are in directly related to this origin. 
Therefore in the following chapters, after discussing how the idea of capturing motion is 
developed, the ontic principle of this art form will be elaborated. Then the nature and 
structure of the cinematographic-image will be examined with regard to its origin. After 
investigating whether and how the structure of this cinematographic-image can manifest 
itself in a film, the aesthetic value of cinema and how beautiful is created in it will be 
critically re-evaluated in the final chapter.  
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1. THE ORIGIN OF CINEMA 
 
 
“For the first time in the history of the arts, in the history of culture, 
 man found the means to take an impression of time.”11  
                                Andrey Tarkovsky 
 
 
If cinema is the art of the cinematographic-image, the search for the origin of cinema 
can only be possible via the search for the origin of the cinematographic-image. In order 
to do that, we first need to examine the cinematographic-image in terms of its outer and 
inner dynamics. The study of its outer dynamics will require the historical analysis of 
how this image is invented. And the inquiry concerning its inner dynamics will 
concentrate on the ontic principle of the cinematographic-image, which hopefully will 
help us explain why people need, love and appreciate cinema, why they were amazed by 
it from its beginning. This survey, by revealing the essence of the cinematographic-
image, will provide an insight into what the origin of cinema is.  
1.1. INVENTION OF THE CINEMATOGRAPHIC-IMAGE 
Aristotle (B.C. 384- B.C. 322) seems to have conceived the first glimpse of what will 
evolve into the cinematographic-image. He noticed that an illuminated image, when 
passed through a pinhole, projected an upside-down image. Later in the 17th century, a 
German Jesuit scholar, Athanasius Kircher, developed a device that had a lens on the 
pinhole and could be used to project an image. He named it camera obscura. In Latin 
“camera” means “chamber/room”, “obscura” means “dark”, the combination of which 
means “dark room”. The image was projected through the “dark room”.  
Another primitive image projector developed in the 17th century was known as the 
Magic Lantern. The name was more about the magical effect of the image. In the 18th                                                         
11 Tarkovsky, Andrey. Sculpting In Time. Hunter‐Blair, Kitty. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2003. p. 62 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century frightening images were projected using magic lanterns in order to startle the 
audiences in Phantasmagoria, which was a form of theatre. The name Phantasmagoria 
evoked fantasy, as the name implies. In a way, these inventions had the quality of 
technological magic, but there was still no motion in the image. The desire of man was 
simply to imitate reality, or intervene reality with projected still images. No one had yet 
considered capturing “the reality in motion”. 
In the 1820’s an optical toy called the Thaumotrope was marketed. The name roughly 
translates as “wonder turner”. It is the combination of two Ancient Greek words: “θαυµα-
thauma” meaning wonder and “τρόπος-tropos” meaning turn. When the disk spun, the 
two images on either side were perceived as one by the eye. This happens as a result of 
the way the mind functions during perception.  
In 1824, the British scientist Peter Mark Roget introduced the phenomenon called the 
persistence of vision. He argued that an image leaves an imprint on the eye and after the 
image is gone the imprinted image is mentally related to the next image. In the case of 
Thaumotrope the eye assumes the two images as one. This opened the door for “moving 
pictures” and inspired the emergence of cinematographic-image. It was realized that if 
there were snapshots of an action in motion and if the snapshots could move fast enough 
then the eye would assume there is movement and would not recognize what’s in 
between, due to the persistence of vision.  
In 1800’s, a device called Phenakistoscope added a revolving shutter to the image. It 
displayed animations produced by the rotation of a single drawing. As a result of the 
persistence of vision it gave the illusion of movement. The name was the combination of 
Ancient Greek words “φενακιστής-phenakistēs” meaning cheat, imposter and  “σκοπέω-
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skope” meaning examine, look to or into. Through the device, one was able to “look into 
the cheating image”. Imitation of movement was something sought after from then on.  
In 1825 French inventor Joseph Nicéphore Niépce produced the world’s first known 
photograph and photographs took the place of drawn images in the imitation of 
movement. After the illusion of movement with photographs, the desire to project and 
capture real movement was inevitable. In 1870, the invention Phasmatrope, which 
consisted of eighteen glass photos on a wheel with a light projected from behind, enabled 
an audience of 1500 to view the first brief motion pictures on screen. Even though such a 
device was able to imitate motion via photographs, it wasn’t yet questioned whether it 
was possible to capture motion in real time.  
In 1872 an English photographer called Eadweard J. Muybridge, as a result of his 
photographic experiments, initiated such an attempt. Muybridge was hired to find out 
whether all four of a horse’s hooves are off the ground at the same time during a gallop. 
Muybridge photographed a running horse by using multiple cameras. In the end he was 
able to capture the horse in fast motion. In fact all four of the horse’s hooves were off the 
ground at the same time during the gallop. More important than the proof of this, 
Muybridge captured the movement and pioneered the invention of camera with this 
experiment. He proved that if you can shoot fast enough you could capture the movement 
as if it’s real. As a matter of fact, in 1874 French scientist Étienne-Jules Marey invented a 
“chronophotographic gun” which could expose 12 photos per second. At first he 
photographed the stars, then he went onto capturing birds in flight. The first photos he 
printed were on glass, then paper, and finally on rolls of celluloid.  
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French inventors Lumiére Brothers invented Cinematograph in 1890. Cinematograph 
was a film camera and also served as a film projector and developer. The name comes 
from the Ancient Greek word “κίνηµα-kinema” which translates as movement. It was the 
first projection device that had “movement” in its name. While this was happening in 
France, in the United States, inventor and businessman Thomas Edison was developing a 
device by the name of Kinetoscope. The device used 50-ft rolls of celluloid threaded over 
a series of spools and backlit by an electric bulb. One person at a time could view the 
pictures by looking in a binocular eyepiece. Kinetoscope is again derived from the Greek 
roots “kinema” (movement) and “scopos” (to view).  After these devices were developed 
the cinematographic-image, as we know today, that is, successive still images on a 
celluloid film, tape or data creating a moving picture, was invented. 
 But this was just the beginning. In its early years inventors were amazed by the idea 
of having a device that could capture motion and re-play it whenever wanted. For 
inventors like Edison, who were also businessmen, the device had the potential to 
become a very lucrative product. It was crucial to attract potential customers to this new 
amazement, the cinematographic-image. The first public showing of a projected motion 
picture with the first movie poster took place in 1895. This was Auguste and Louis 
Lumiére’s “cinematographe”.  
Following this, the art of cinema developed very quickly and attracted millions to 
theaters. However, how and why this new form of art became so popular so quickly 
cannot be explained merely on the basis of its outer dynamics. Therefore, in the following 
section, we will look into the ontic principle that makes possible and conditions the 
cinematographic-image.  
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1.2. THE ONTIC PRINCIPLE OF THE CINEMATOGRAPHIC-IMAGE 
It is important to say that the origin of an art object never refers to any kind of 
substantive being or a substance. The origin of an artistic form is what the art itself is 
born from. More than an element, it is the source of this form and it becomes the 
matter/material of the object of art created accordingly. In other words, the origin appears 
in the artistic form as its ontic principle. Ontic principle is the kind of principle that 
reveals the way things come ‘to be’. It does not ground but rather governs. It reveals the 
underlying nature of the artistic form. Therefore by questioning the ontic principle of the 
cinematographic-image, we aim to reach the origin of it.  
Tarkovsky states that cinema is the first art form that is the direct result of a 
technological invention in answer to a ‘vital need’. The ‘vital need’ Tarkovsky talks 
about is an instrumental need that is ontically required:  
It was the instrument which humanity had to have in order to increase its mastery over 
the real world.12  
This instrumental character comes to life with technology, however technology is just 
a medium. As the medium of an art form, which itself is the pure result of a technological 
revolution, technology appears as the main tool in all the outer developments and for the 
expression of the inner dynamics of cinema. However, what is important about the 
invention of cinema isn’t its medium, but rather the ‘vital need’ it fulfills. According to 
Tarkovsky, the function of cinema in terms of answering that vital need concerned with 
increasing man’s mastery over the real world should be explained on the basis of its 
unique features. He first points out that cinema, with regard to its subject matter, seems 
not much different than any other art form:  
                                                        
12 Ibid., p. 82 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Cinema should be a means of exploring the most complex problems of our times, as 
vital as those, which for centuries have been the subject of literature, music and 
painting.13 
However, after stating that “the domain of any art form is limited to one aspect of our 
spiritual and emotional discovery of surrounding reality”14, Tarkovsky argues that cinema 
has the potential to re-discover our surrounding reality without any limit and it is only the 
art of cinema that is able to fully cover the real human experience. For him cinema can 
fulfill man spiritually and reform our empirical reality. This is the vital need cinema 
answers. Then the question is: how can cinema fulfill this need?  
The outer development of the cinematographic-image starts with the desire to project 
still images. This is followed by the desire to project moving images and then the desire 
to capture movement. It is already mentioned that the word cinema comes from the Greek 
word “κίνηµα-kinema», which means movement, and, at first glance, this seems to be the 
distinctive aspect that separates cinema from plastic arts. This is the common attitude of 
the early silent era. Back then, filmmakers and theorists were trying to understand cinema 
in terms of its contrast with other arts. As the movement of the visual became the main 
point of reference, such theorists as Ricciotto Canudo saw no problem in describing 
cinema as sculpture in motion, painting in movement, architecture in movement.15 They 
had a point because while the rest of the visual arts are static, cinematographic-image 
directly re-presents movement since its invention. If that is the case and also if cinema, as 
a technological development, stems from the desire to capture and project movement, 
can’t this be the ontic principal of cinema? In fact, its capability to capture reality in 
motion seems to be the unique aspect of this new art. Even today, the fundamental                                                         
13 Ibid., p. 80 
14 Ibid., p. 82 
15 Stam, Robert. Film Theory: An Introduction. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Inc. 2000. P. 33 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achievement of this technical development is to give the spectator a possibility of 
interaction with some other reality. However, the nature of movement captured and 
reproduced by cinema comprises more than just a simple action, or a simple outer 
alteration. It actually contains time in its nature as its fundamental condition of 
possibility. Therefore, any investigation that takes movement as the ontic principle of 
cinema should eventually address and analyze the issue concerning the cinematic 
conception and representation of time. 
In fact, even imagining the possibility of capturing motion required new mental 
conditions, new forms and associations. Before then, captured movement was 
unthinkable for many reasons, but most importantly it was unthinkable because man 
wasn’t able to have a mastery over time, over the past. With the cinematographic-image, 
he obtained the ability to freeze time and re-play it when he wanted. In other words, not 
only movement but also time was captured in the cinematographic-image. It became 
possible to represent time as something relative to the subject. We will discuss the 
concept of time in the following chapter, but for now it should be noted that such an 
approach to the concept of time refers to subjective time. Before Kant, time was 
considered as the measurement of motion and change, but after him it was regarded 
something relative to the subject in which movement becomes just a perception of time.  
With the invention of cinema, man who can now capture and re-create time 
unconditionally re-placed himself in the world. The idea of being the master of time, 
governed the birth of cinematographic-image because with cinema, more than anything, 
man became able to take an impression of time. For Tarkovsky, this is the real dramatic 
development of cinema:  
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No ‘dead’ object—table, chair, glass—taken in a frame in isolation from everything 
else, can be presented as it were outside passing time, as if from the point of view of an 
absence of time.16  
Within the visible, time, which Tarkovsky takes to be prior to the creation of the 
cinematographic-image, can be recorded no matter what and this makes time the main 
element, the very foundation of cinema. Time “can vanish without trace in our material 
world for it is a subjective, spiritual category”17. However in cinema, with each image a 
new series of time opens and when it finishes the series ends as well. Thus, when cinema 
takes an impression of time, in each impression time reveals its nature as the multiplicity 
of time in the form of captured and re-playable time series. Therefore the ontic principle 
of the cinematographic-image lies within this definition of time. The cinematographic-
image, by its very nature and constitution, represents time subjectively, as solely related 
to man, and not necessarily as an actual entity that clocks measure. 
The influence of the cinematographic-image on cultural structures was immense: 
Today capturing time is so easy; one can do it even through a cell-phone. The idea of 
time constituting a multiple reality is already accepted; it is a notion we explicitly or 
implicitly utilize almost in every form of social interaction based on mass media and the 
Internet. However, this paper does not question long-term effects of cinema on cultural 
structures or formations; it only proposes that the ontic principle governing the 
cinematographic-image lies in its ability to present itself as a unique artistic 
problematization of the subjectivity and multiplicity of time. And this is how cinema 
fulfills the vital need Tarkovsky refers to.  
                                                        
16 Tarkovsky, Andrey. Sculpting In Time. Hunter‐Blair, Kitty. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2003. p. 68 
17 Ibid., p. 58 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If the ontic principle is connected to time then could time be the origin of 
cinematographic-image? Then time should manifest itself in the structure and nature of 
the cinematographic-image as a factor that conditions their being. In other words, the 
structure and nature evolves around the origin, which functions like their first cause. This 
metaphysical origin, as the ontic principle, governs the happening of the 
cinematographic-image. It gives rise to and conditions the nature of the cinematographic-
image. The origin manifests itself within the image as its way of communicating to the 
subject, and it structures the image. Therefore, how the cinematographic-image conveys 
time becomes essential to understanding its origin. If we can prove that time is in the 
nature and structure of the cinematographic-image, then we can try to find out whether 
the same essence exists in cinema as well, that is, whether a movie, as a cinematic work 
of art, is able to convey its content and establish communication with the viewer in the 
same structurally determined way as its single unit, the cinematographic-image, does. 
Assuming this is established, then we can conclude that time constitutes the origin of 
cinema, therefore its aesthetic value. However, before all this, we need to understand 
what time is. 
  33 
2. THE CONCEPT OF TIME 
 
 
“Time is invention or it is nothing at all.”18 
Henri Bergson 
 
 
For an analysis of the concept of time, first we need to elucidate what is actually 
meant by “time.” Is it the totality of units, which substantiate the concepts of past, 
present, and future; line up one’s memories chronologically; and indicate the alteration of 
the material things? Or it is pure intuition that affects us imperceptibly as the continuity 
of our being: an intuition hidden behind the definition of time as the measurement-unit of 
movement to make the imperceptible perceptible via space? Is time an objective entity or 
an element of human subjectivity?  
2.1. OBJECTIVE TIME 
If time has objective reality, then it has to be an actual entity that exists outside the 
human subjectivity, therefore it cannot be the product of human mind. Man, therefore, is 
a simple observer of time, perceiving it as the property of the object or as its category. 
Namely, time exists independently of the subject.  
Aristotle conceives of time as an actual entity, which has objective reality. He 
considers man as a simple observer who perceives time but has no part in its existence. In 
this observation, man perceives changes in the object and experiences time due to these 
changes. Thus, according to Aristotle, the experience of change is prior to the perception 
of time and the experience of time depends on the perception of change. In this sense, it 
is only through change that one can explain the concept of time. Then what is Aristotle’s 
account of change?                                                         
18 Bergson, Henri‐Louis. Creative Evolution. Mitchell, Arthur. Cosimo Classics, Inc. 2007. p. 371 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The nature of change is explained in Physics, Book I, as if the object loses something 
and gains something else. In Book III change is explained as the potentiality of the 
object.  
Hence we can define motion as the fulfillment of the moveable qua moveable, the cause 
of the attribute being in contact with what can move so that the mover is also acted on.19  
Ursula Coope, in Time Of Aristotle, interprets this explanation as change being the 
actuality of that which potentially is, qua such. If there is a change within the object, this 
change happens towards a certain end state, and the object, which has the potential to be 
in such an end state of change, can be actualized. If we take bronze for an example and its 
potential to be a statue, becoming a statue is a potentiality of being bronze, which can be 
actualized. This means that change is the actuality of the statue and not the actuality of 
being bronze. Thus not as being a statue but as becoming a statue, potentiality lies in 
being bronze, because it is always potential.  
In a way change is always incomplete. The different stages of the change will be 
successively present. These new present moments point out that change always goes 
forward but never backwards. Nothing becomes what it was before: there is a path that 
change follows, i.e. there is something prior to change and it is followed by change.  
According to Coope, the magnitude over which a change occurs is a spatial path 
associated with the change. Change follows magnitude, the way time follows change. 
Magnitude is like the path of the movement; as the movement follows the path, change 
follows magnitude. Aristotle argues that since between any two points on a line there can 
always be another point, spatial magnitude is continuous, which means change is 
continuous because of spatial magnitude. In fact change is infinitely divisible too; 
                                                        
19 Aristotle. Physics. South Dakota: NuVision Publications, 2007. Book III – 2. p. 46 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between every change there is another change. This means we cannot divide change in 
numbers and count it. It is the continuity of the spatial magnitude as the before and after 
that explains the continuity of change. Which means change follows the before and after, 
which is the magnitude. 
If time follows change then such before and after are always the part of time. As a 
result, time will be continuous too. Time follows change, which means that time depends 
on change. Change, on the other hand, can only be conceivable if we can designate the 
passing time between two present moments. If there were no distinctions between 
antecedent and subsequent moments, then change would take no time. Since change is 
infinitely divisible, then it must happen in the course of an infinitely divisible period of 
time. If we claim that there can be no time unless there is change, since change will 
happen in a place, then there can be no time without spatial movement:  
The distinction of ‘before’ and ‘after’ holds primarily, then, in place; and there in virtue 
of relative position. Since then ‘before’ and ‘after’ hold in magnitude, they must hold 
also in movement, these corresponding to those. But also in time the distinction of 
‘before’ and ‘after’ must hold, for time and movement always correspond with each 
other.20  
In time, present moments are ordered as “before and after” according to the state of 
change they are in. But why is there only the present, and not the past or the future? In 
Physics, Aristotle divides time into parts to investigate it, then questions which parts 
exist. One of the parts (past) had existed, which means it does not exist anymore. Another 
part (future) will exist, which means it does not yet exist. Since a thing that only consists 
of non-existing parts cannot exist, if something exists, even if not all the parts exist, some 
parts of it must exist. Then there is only present left for time to exist. The present moment 
is in the middle and carries the end of the past and the beginning of the future. Thus the                                                         
20 Ibid., Book IV – 11. p. 81 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present moment has no borders and is variable.  Between every two present moments 
there is always another present moment. It is infinitely divisible. However time cannot 
have actual divisions like a line would have. 
The present moments divide time into potential divisions infinitely; between every 
two present moments there can be another present moment. Every end, that is, the border 
of time, will always be within a present moment and therefore every end will always be 
the mark of a new beginning as well, which means that time will never end. It also means 
that the present moment is the part that changes and it is the actuality of that which 
potentially is, qua the end of the past moment and the beginning of the future moment. In 
a sense present moment can only divide time potentially. Present is variable, infinitely 
divisible and has no borders. It is a potential division of time.  
Aristotle says that we know time has passed whenever we distinguish between two 
different ‘nows’ or instants. Time is the order of continuous present moments that line up 
one after another. It only exists as the successiveness of present moments. Thus 
according to such definition of time, if the present moment was not a variable thing, but 
immutable, time would not exist. Namely if there is no change between present moments, 
there would be no time. Variable borders between the past and the future would not exist 
and time would not flow, which, in turn, means that if there isn’t any present moment 
then there isn’t time.  
Yet, Aristotle does not consider the present moment as a part of time. Since all the 
things that contribute to the whole have to be measured and the present cannot be 
measured, it is not a part of time. Even though the present does not have borders, but it is 
the border between the past and the future. What measures the present moment and 
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designates the borders of time is the designation of the present moment between the past 
and the future. Therefore we designate the change that follows spatial magnitude by the 
designation of different presents.  
Despite this close relation between change and time, neither change nor movement is 
time. According to Aristotle, movement and change of each thing is only in the changing 
thing itself or wherever the moving or changing thing itself happens to be. Change is 
always localized. It is always within the changing thing and always at some specific 
place. On the contrary, time is ubiquitous: it is both everywhere and within everything the 
same, because the number of equal and simultaneous movements is everywhere one and 
the same. This is one reason to say that time is not the same as change.  
Aristotle also says that change can become faster or slower, but time cannot. 
Regardless of that, by definition, speed of change is connected to time; according to 
whether the change is greater or smaller within a set amount of time, change can be either 
slow or fast. However, Aristotle thinks that time cannot be defined by time, therefore 
change cannot be time. Yet he also states that change is all there is for us to understand 
the concept of time. Then time is not change but it is ‘something of change’ because time 
can be experienced only if there is change.  
We know that we perceive the change of things within a magnitude as the before and 
the after. We also know that we designate changes through present moments. Then it 
means that time is something we mark out in changes, in a way it is the number of 
changes. By that, Aristotle refers to something that can be counted. But if we consider 
that time only consists of potential divisions, such as the present moment, then how can 
we count change? 
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There are two kinds of numbers, the ones that we count and the ones that are 
countable. “Number” here means measuring the size of sets.  For something to be 
counted in numbers, it has to be a discrete collection of things, but something that is 
continuous can also become countable by its potential divisions. The important thing to 
distinguish here is the difference between the numbers, which we count and which are 
countable. Something that is countable is essentially ordered, whereas what we count is 
essentially a quantity. In this sense we count the collections of discrete things but we 
measure the continuous magnitudes. Time, which is continuous and follows magnitude 
via change, is something that is countable and essentially ordered; it is potentially divided 
by present moments. It has nothing to do with counting units, but rather time occurs as 
the measurement of change or measurable by the change. In this sense time becomes the 
number of changes between before and after. In other words, time is the number of 
present moments.  
If we want to measure change (since it is continuous too) the present moments need 
to be marked out. But to be able to measure, like in counting, we will need a unit to 
measure accordingly. To measure change and thus to mark the present moments as a unit, 
we will need a standard such as a change that is continuously repeated. Aristotle thinks it 
is the cycling motion of the universe, the movement of the sphere, which we can measure 
accordingly: 
The other movements are measured by this, and time by this movement.21 
Since change follows magnitude and magnitude is before and after in a place, then the 
movement of the universe as the path that change follows, is prior to time. This 
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88 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movement is also a spatial change and it is perceived by the designation of two different 
present moments: 
Hence motions may be consecutive or successive in virtue of the time being continuous, 
but there can be continuity only in virtue of the motions themselves being continuous, 
that is when the end of each is one with the end of the other.22  
Thereby time is the number of measurement, but because it has beginning and end, it 
is not the number of the same point, more likely the endpoints of a line. If we consider 
time something like a line then the present moment would be something like the 
endpoints of the line; between ‘before’ and ‘after’. However, according to Aristotle, if the 
present moment were an endpoint, then the topology of such time would not be a straight 
line. If this were so, then the endpoints would be as separate as black and white and they 
would never coincide. There can be no continuity. If only the motion is circular, the 
continuity of time can occur. Therefore for Aristotle, the concepts of alteration and 
continuity (which are related to time) are only possible if time is in circular motion.  
As a matter of fact, Gilles Deleuze, in his Four Lectures On Kant, defines Aristotle’s 
time view as circular time. He also indicates that circular time and circular motion was a 
commonly accepted concept in Ancient Greece. This concept was ever-present: 
everything from tragedies to Platonic cosmology consisted of circles. A world that is 
governed by circular motion unfolds time as successive continuity in which the present 
moment links the past and the future, and therefore every moment follows the next 
according to the law of nature, meaning the before moment always conditions the next 
one and it is always the cause of it. The end is fixed from the very beginning. In this 
sense time has no relation to the mind whatsoever. Such objective time refers to the 
                                                        
22 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Book V‐ 4. p. 100 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succession of changing relations and man becomes an object within time, or a simple 
observer of time.  
Fatalism is a great example to see the possible ethical implications of this philosophy 
of time. In Fatalism, time flows between two points, from the beginning to an end as 
objective time. Hence, the future is seen as something inevitable and inflexible. This 
shows us the ethical concern of Aristotle’s time philosophy: time dominates what is to 
come under the cover of fate. As the result of that, in Greek tragedies—which gave birth 
to dramatic structure—time was aestheticized as already written fate in Aristotle’s 
Poetics. For example, in Oedipus Rex, the character’s fate is already written. Oedipus 
tries to escape from the seeker’s prophecy but his fate pursues him and eventually catches 
up with him. Time unfolds as cause and effect and brings forth fate – or at least this is 
how Aristotle’s Poetics defines the underlying truth in this play.  
On the other hand, could it be Oedipus’ own character that shapes his fate? In the first 
major incident of the play, Oedipus literally finds himself at a crossroads. This is clearly 
a metaphor for the three choices that he has. One: he can choose to go back to his family 
who raised him (and never kill his parents). Two: he can start a new journey (in which he 
never kills or marries anyone, disproving the oracle). Three: he acts as the oracle foresaw 
(killing his father and marrying his mother). In fact, Oedipus, despite what he is told, kills 
a man and marries an older woman. He knows that he is making choices that could be 
fulfilling the prophecy, yet he does not stop. So in the end we can still question if this 
circular time is even the real underlying meaning of the Ancient Greek plays. In such 
interpretation of Oedipus Rex, Oedipus’s character creates the cycling motion of 
Aristotle’s time.  
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If time is Oedipus’s written fate, like Aristotle argues, then time mimics the cycling 
movement of the universe via the law of nature in man’s life. The continuity of cause and 
effect as a kind of magnitude like before and after directs one’s fate, but it is strictly 
determined. Aristotle’s time, as in the belief of fate, is transmitted within a cycling 
motion and manifests itself within the law of nature. In this case everything is perceived 
as the reflection of cause and effect and the next moment is already fixed by the former 
moment, i.e. it is predetermined.  
Such understanding of time, where it merely refers to objective changes, cannot be 
the origin of the cinematographic-image. The concept of time that structures the ontic 
principle of the cinematographic-image is relative to the subject. In this sense, time that 
works according to the law of nature cannot be the origin that refers to how man can 
master the real world, by capturing, freezing, and re-playing time. If man can play with 
the order of time by capturing it and re-playing it, then it must be something other than 
the number of changes that follow magnitude and only move forward. Time that is the 
origin of the cinematographic-image is not objective. In the next section, various 
conceptions of subjective time from Augustine to Kant will be investigated in order to see 
whether subjective time could be the origin of the cinematographic-image. 
2.2. SUBJECTIVE TIME 
2.2.1 AUGUSTINE’S ACCOUNT OF TIME 
After Aristotle up until Leibniz and Kant, many philosophers considered time as an 
objective phenomenon. Kant achieved the real breakthrough in terms of re-defining the 
concept of time. But long before him, a thinker from the early Christian era, Saint 
Augustine (C.E. 354 – C.E. 430) assigned an important subjectivity to time: 
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I measure as time present the impression that things make on you as they pass by and 
what remains after they have passed by—I do not measure the things themselves which 
have passed by and left their impression on you. This is what I measure when I measure 
periods of time. Either, then, these are the periods of time or else I do not measure time 
at all.23 
In such measurement of time, time is what one gets by the investigation of the present 
and the present moment. The act of measurement is not the measurement of an objective 
alteration but rather an alteration of the scattered moments within the eternal present. 
Like Aristotle, Augustine thinks that time consists of present moments, but unlike 
Aristotle, Augustine considers them as equal to time.  
In fact, according to Augustine, the past and the future do not exist. If they exist, they 
would only exist as the present time, because they cannot exist in the present time as the 
past, or as the future. Then how do the past and the future exist in the present? For 
Augustine, they only exist, as they are experienced in the mind. When the present 
moment moves to the past it also moves into the memory. What is in the mind is just the 
reflection of the past (or the future) and never the real thing. The past and the future can 
only exist in the mind and in the memory as the present. As a result of that, man’s time is 
reduced to the present.  
Augustine’s understanding of time evokes the doctrine that only the objects of the 
present can be real, and the objects of the past and the future do not exist. According to 
this doctrine called presentism, even though time is only in the present tense, it is still real 
and different than space. In fact, Augustine follows the same logic and rejects the 
existence of the past and the future. The only possibility of existence is in the present. 
Presentism considers locational existence as true existence, so does Augustine.                                                          
23 Saint Augustine. Confessions. Outler, Albert C. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1955. Book XI, Chapter XXVII‐36. 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Since the past and the future are located in the mind, Augustine defines them in terms 
of their relation to the mind. Augustine denies tripartite time (the past - the present - the 
future) and instead he offers threefold time (present time regarding the past - present time 
regarding the present - present time regarding the future). They basically refer to 
memory, intuition and expectation. Thus, Augustine views time as a product of the mind, 
because one creates this subjective concept of time, by living the past and the future in 
the mind. The mind collects the past and the future as memories and expectations in the 
present as a momentary intuition.  
If we analyze Augustine’s philosophy of time only in regard to its relation to the 
mind, we can easily say it is subjective. However for him, time is the property of God, 
i.e. it is the property of another substance. In Confessions, Augustine starts to investigate 
time by asking “what did God make before he made the heaven and earth?”24 He replies 
that heaven and earth came out of nothing, since God is the creator. Therefore before 
anything has been created there cannot be anything, i.e. before God creates heaven and 
earth there cannot be anything that God was doing. If there cannot be anything before he 
created it, then before anything is created, God couldn’t have been waiting since he had 
not yet created time:  
There could be no time without a created world.25  
Because God created time, it can exist independently of the mind, but cannot exist 
independently of God. Thus, albeit time has no substance, it still is a property of another 
substance: time is the property of God. The existence of time in this sense does not lie 
within the human mind or human subjectivity. Augustine reduces time and ontology to                                                         
24 Ibid., Book XI, Chapter XXX. p.193 
25 Ibid., Book XI, Chapter XXX. p.193 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God and therefore time becomes something that is created and the mind becomes the tool 
for time to be recognized by man. Therefore, time, for Augustine, even though is 
connected to the human mind, is not, in its essence, relative to the subject.  
Time’s dependence on God cannot manifest itself in cinematographic-image. We 
have mentioned that the origin of cinema evolves from its ontic principle, the 
manipulation of time, which arises in answer to a vital need of man to master nature. In 
this case time that is in the origin of cinematographic-image must be relative to the 
subject and not to any higher power. Thus, Augustine’s time that is not subjective in its 
essence is also not the kind of time concept that is in the origin of cinematographic-
image.  
2.2.2. KANT’S ACCOUNT OF TIME 
Kant’s philosophy of time offers a more profound approach to the concept of time in 
terms of subjectivity. Kant does not explain time on the basis of its relation to God. But 
more importantly, he creates a real breakthrough and defines time regardless of 
movement and change, in which they become the perception of time. In fact, time was 
considered as the measurement of motion and never given full subjectivity until Kant. He 
puts forward an elaborate analysis of the concept of time in the Critique of Pure Reason. 
In this book, Kant aims to find and establish the limits of human reasoning. Heidegger, in 
Kant and The Problem of Metaphysics, defines the finitude of mankind as the source of 
Kant’s philosophy.  
In Kant’s philosophy world has two parts, world of appearances (phenomenon) and 
world of thing in itself (noumenon). Since man, as one of the beings on the earth belongs 
to the world of phenomenon, he cannot experience the thing-in-itself. Kant thinks that we 
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cannot have any knowledge of the world of noumenon because it is not perceptible by 
our empirical perception. However, Kant also thinks that there is only one way to gain 
knowledge and that is the empirical way. The data, which comes from the thing-in-itself, 
is organized or rather ‘synthesized’ by a priori forms of sensible intuition and a priori 
concepts, i.e. categories of understanding. These forms and categories belong to the 
faculties, hence to structure of the mind. It is because of these forms and categories that 
the empirical world is experienced the way it is. These formal principles do not belong to 
the world of phenomenon; they set the limits for all sensible perception, condition all 
possible experiences, and are the same for everyone. The appearances are the way we 
perceive them because of the structure of the human mind, not because of their own 
reality. All given data can only be experienced within these forms and we can only 
comprehend things within them. While categories help us to understand, forms make the 
experience possible. Thus when we use the filter of forms in order to understand by 
categories, thing in itself disappears and we perceive things as phenomenon. According to 
Kant, time is one of the two a priori forms of sensible intuition:  
Time is a necessary representation that grounds all intuitions. In regard to appearances 
in general one cannot remove time, though one can very well take the appearances away 
from time. Time is therefore given a priori. In it alone is all actuality of appearances 
possible. The latter could all disappear, but time itself, as the universal condition of 
their possibility, cannot be removed.26 
Kant argues that time belongs to the structure of the human mind and it is not 
something that is produced by it. For Kant, the mind produces appearances, which is the 
physical world, but time is not something that belongs to the objects of this world either. 
On the contrary, time is about our point of view, our perception of the object, but it is 
never a quality that belongs to the object itself. Thus unlike Aristotle, Kant argues that                                                         
26 Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason. Guyer, Paul and Wood, Allen. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1998. p. 162 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change can be conceivable because of time, and not vice versa. Everything that changes 
becomes a sensible object and is placed in order by time. If we say that the perception of 
change cannot happen without the concept of time, then time becomes a universal form 
of the world of phenomena. 
Even though time is a universal form, it is also relative to the subject and therefore it 
is also subjective. Time has no other presence than being a form of intuition and 
belonging to the mind’s structure. Thus time, according to Kant, is a subjective condition 
and a pure intuition, which exists by the nature of man’s mind, and gives order, provides 
uniformity to sensed objects. It is the structure of the mind that demands one common 
time perception for everyone. Therefore time has only one dimension: different times are 
not simultaneous, but successive. Different times are just the different parts of one and 
the same time. 
Moments follow one another and it is a single time concept; there is no multiplicity of 
time series but rather one temporal reality. Although it is subjective, if there is not 
multiplicity of different subjectivities but a single time perception (which is universal and 
shared by everyone), then how can time be subjective to everyone? We already said that 
Kant’s subjective time is a priori form and therefore it conditions experience. In other 
words it is subjective because it is relative to the subject, but also Kant’s subjective time 
is transcendentally objective. If this is the case, then Kant’s concept of time cannot offer 
a pure subjectivity, either.  
Kant gets close to the multiplicity of subjectivities when he gives the power of 
opening new series to the subject. However, such series are never temporal but causal 
series connected to Kant’s account of time. This is explained in the first critique, in the 
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antinomies of rational cosmology. Antinomies of rational cosmology occur because of 
Transcendental Illusion and they are basically a kind of syllogism. If we look at the 
categories of understanding, we see that antinomies are a hypothetical kind of syllogism. 
This means that it refers to such premise as ‘If A, then B’: If every composite substance 
consists of simple parts, then there is such a thing as simple parts. Kant starts his 
argument with the antithesis of the thesis he would like to discuss. For example, to 
analyze the thesis about simple parts, he starts with assuming “that composite substance 
do not consist of simple parts…”27 In the end both the thesis and the antithesis are proved 
and Kant essentially underlines the contradiction of such an idea.  
It is the third antinomy that is important for us, because it proposes a kind of time 
topology, which is different than Aristotle’s circular time. This antinomy questions the 
possibility of another causality other than the laws of nature. In this antinomy, Kant’s 
thesis is “Causality in accordance with laws of nature is not the only one from which all 
the appearances of the world can be derived. It is also necessary to assume another 
causality through freedom in order to explain them”28. In order to prove this proposition 
he negates it and assumes the law of nature as the only causality. This means that every 
case conditions an effect, and without any cause there cannot be any effect. There has to 
be a first cause for everything to start if the law of nature is the only causality. Reason, 
however, looks for the beginning that exists without a cause. Therefore the statement, 
which would say that the only causality is through the law of nature, conflicts with itself. 
If the laws of nature are the only causality then there cannot be any beginning since every 
effect needs a cause. On the other hand since everything works within such a law, there                                                         
27 Ibid., p. 476 
28 Ibid., p. 484 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cannot be any progression either. If the former incident is the condition of the latter one, 
then the cause and the effect will already be determined. If everything happens as cause 
and effect, there can’t be any effect either, since the future is already set. Therefore such 
causality cannot exist on its own.  
In this antinomy Kant also talks about transcendental freedom. Such a thing happens 
if the causality comes up as an absolute causal spontaneity beginning with itself.  For 
Kant free cause is the only way for any kind of causality and therefore movement.  If we 
say there is a single causality, and if it is through the law of nature, then there has to be 
only one initial cause, which we said is contradictory. There has to be multiple free 
causes, those that can start new series. Therefore transcendental freedom also makes 
experience possible and the beginning becomes unconditioned. 
. . . transcendental freedom, without which even in the course of nature the series of 
appearances is never complete on the side of the causes.29  
According to Kant man is capable of opening such series because man who is an 
appearance along with the other appearances in the world, also has a part of noumenon in 
himself, and it is his Reason. This view opens up Kant’s philosophy from metaphysics to 
ethics in the Critique of Practical Reason.  For him free will is the only way for mankind 
to be moral beings. Not because he thinks he proves theoretically that we are free or we 
can ever get the knowledge of such an act, but because we are able to start new 
unconditioned series without cause: that way we can be practically free. Since we are 
coming to that point by free will and not as an effect, there are possible moral values for 
the action – right and wrong. Therefore acting upon free will becomes ethical choice: 
Pure reason is a practice by itself and it gives mankind a universal law, i.e., moral law.30                                                          
29 Ibid., p. 484 
30 Kant, Immanuel, Critique of Practical Reason. Pluhar, Werner S., September Hackett Publishing Co., 2002. p. 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Man who can differentiate freely between right from wrong, by using his reason, can 
open up new causal series. Deleuze describes it with a quote from Hamlet: ‘time is out of 
joint’. In the play, when they send Hamlet to exile, free cause is created because after that 
point Hamlet acts in a way that no one expects him to, i.e. the coming events are not 
determined by past events. Hamlet’s spontaneity after his exile demonstrates that a man 
can act using his free will and can start a first cause. This is the reason why Deleuze 
defines Kant’s time, which is a form of intuition, as linear time, because time is relative 
to subject, no one can know what can happen next, and unlike in circular time, the future 
is unknown. Aristotle’s man is enslaved by time due to law of nature. 
In such freedom Kant finds lawlessness. For him laws of nature and freedom are two 
separate things; as law and lawlessness. Laws of nature present the synthesis of the 
experience, which happens by conditioning the conditioned, whereas the latter presents 
an unconditioned causality that moves by itself, since freedom cannot have any given 
law. According to Allen Wood, Kant wants to show that on the one hand we are obligated 
to the laws of nature, but on the other (as noumenon) we are affected by reason’s 
causality according to freedom and these two do not conflict.  
In the end we can say that Kant considers time as a subjective notion and thereon 
movement becomes the perception of time. However, along with this he also argues that 
time is universal and it is the same in everyone’s mind as a form of intuition. As a result 
Kant’s subjective time becomes transcendentally objective. Therefore, his linear time is 
like the time of a clock, which is within empirical reality and only one time series.  
In terms of the ontic principle of the cinematographic-image during its invention, 
time’s relativity to the subject is close to Kant’s linear time, where the subject creates the 
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next moment. However, the subjective time, which is the origin of the cinematographic-
images, has to have a different kind of nature. If man can capture time and re-play it 
whenever he wants, then it means he also creates multiplicity of time. Not simply in 
terms of causality but also in terms of temporality, since the images all have their own 
time series. What I mean is this: with the cinematographic-image a series of captured 
time starts, and when the image stops, the temporality of the series of images ends. 
Therefore this kind of subjective time also has to have multiplicity. In this sense the 
cinematographic-image is re-defined time in multiplicity. If this is the case then the kind 
of multiplicity, which the cinematographic-image offers, cannot be explained with Kant’s 
account of time. Such multiplicity is best conveyed in Henri Bergson’s concept of 
duration. Thus in the next section we will investigate Bergson’s account of time.  
2.3. DURATION – TEMPORAL SUBJECTIVITY 
Subjective time must relate to the mind. It cannot be a property of a substance, 
because if it is, then it cannot be relative to the subject essentially. Even if time belongs 
to man’s mind and has no substantive reality other than being a form that belongs to 
man’s mind, we can still question it in terms of its universality. As we have seen in the 
account of Kant, time is a form of intuition and it belongs to the structure of the mind. 
Because of that structure, we perceive time as one numerical unity, i.e. as a single time 
series. As a result, man’s concept of time is universal. Therefore the universal validity of 
the concept of time makes it objective to everyone and we can question whether time 
(even though it is relative to the mind) can be subjective. However, what is in question 
here is that if such a concept of time is the origin of the cinematographic-image or not. To 
  51 
answer such a question, the ontic principle of the cinematographic-image is the only hint 
we have.  
In regard to the ontic principle, we know that the cinematographic-image has the 
power of creating new time series. Being able to capture and re-play time is actually the 
power to open new temporal series. If this is the case then subjective time consists of 
multiple subjectivities. Therefore the kind of subjectivity of time, which the 
cinematographic-image refers to, has to have no other presence other than being in 
relation to the subject, but also, since there are multiple subjects, time must be within a 
kind of multiplicity. Bergson’s concept of duration is such a concept of time; it is related 
to memory and intuition, thus it is particular for every person. 
Bergson talks about two kinds of multiplicity as well as two kinds of time: 
‘mathematical time’ and ‘real and psychological time’. Mathematical time is in the field 
of analytical perception. Bergson does not include this in his study, because he argues 
that analytical perception only consists of representations. Mathematical time is the time 
of a clock and it is the reflection of empirical perception. It is homogeneous, static, 
infinitely divisible and absolute. In connection to that, time appears as the dimension of 
space. Time, as well as space, can be divided, counted and altered in terms of quantity. 
Such a concept of time would be in quantitative multiplicity, which is homogeneous. It is 
a whole that consists of successive units, which are the moments that follow each other 
within the cause-and-effect relationship. In such a perception, ‘before’ and ‘after’ are 
contiguous, conscious moments, which are lined back to back and come from a fixed 
point of view.  
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According to Bergson, while being one of the images in this material world like 
everything else, our body makes choices too, to eliminate its own deprivation. It separates 
what it needs from what it does not. This process of empirical perception is the work of 
intellect. While revolving around the object we translate symbols that we see from our 
point of view and line them up back to back to create analytic perception. This is our 
empirical perception, which has a discontinuous view of the material world and cannot 
pass over the given data. Bergson, in Matter and Memory, says that  
Pure perception, in fact, however rapid we suppose it to be, occupies a certain depth of 
duration, so that our successive perceptions are never the real moments of things, . . . 
but are moments of our consciousness.31  
It is only through a subjective process that one can experience the real moment of 
things. Time as we know is not the result of such a process and therefore time of a clock 
is not the real-time. Bergson’s doctoral thesis Time and Free Will (1889) starts with the 
explanation of real-time as the multiplicity of duration and defining the concept of 
intuition. Bergson defines intellectual sympathy in his book Creative Mind as intuition. It 
entails conceiving the object by going into the object instead of revolving around it. 
According to him we take snapshots of the passing reality and recompose the object artificially.  But  instead  of  this  we  can  attach  ourselves  to  the  inner  becoming  of things  intuitively. Such relation gets rid of the difference between the subject and the 
object, because the subject realizes the difference of the object and goes into it by 
sympathy. This intuition is the intuition of the self, which is produced by the ego. Such 
intuition is very different than analytical perception, which happens by perceiving in 
parts. This kind of analytical approach never gives us the reality, because we can never 
conceive it as a whole.                                                          
31 Bergson, Henri‐Louis. Matter and Memory. Paul, N. M. & Palmer W. S. New York: Zone Books, 1991. p. 69 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In intuition ‘before’ and ‘after’ do not necessarily follow magnitude as in the case of 
Aristotle, rather they interact each other. By intuition Bergson finds a way to reach this 
whole. Conceiving the object by going into it, by sympathy, actually happens by going 
into one’s own self. This is not simply self-awareness, but it is more like catching the 
harmony of inner becoming of the self. This kind of sympathy towards one’s self touches 
the world around us; it expands heterogeneously. If a person can concentrate enough on 
the sympathy towards him or herself, to conceive the self, this person can self-locate 
within the duration and expand to the absolute duration. Duration, which is particular for 
everyone, flows via qualitative alterations within the whole. In this sense the kind of 
multiplicity duration has is in accordance with quality. 
The multiplicity in accordance with quantity is homogenous and with quality 
heterogeneous. Unlike space, duration is indivisible and cannot be measured in a 
numerical, mathematical fashion. It is the totality of different moments, which are like 
emotions. Bergson himself gives emotions as an example of multiplicity in accordance 
with quality. Emotions, which are all different from one another, can exist singularly but 
can still intervene and affect each other. Multiplicity occurs because duration, which has 
no borders, qualitatively differs from each and every duration. Duration is nothing more 
than successive qualitative alterations and has no quantitative determination. Bergson 
defines pure duration as  
. . . the form, which the succession of our conscious states assumes when our ego lets 
itself live, when it refrains from separating its present state from its former states.32 
We cannot see change in terms of numbers or before and after, but we can experience 
it more like the inner change. Those alterations cannot be expressed in any way because 
                                                        
32 Bergson, Henri‐Louis. Time and Free Will. Ponson, F. L. Montana: Kessinger Publishing Company. p. 100 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they are the states of becoming. Every moment is distinctive to others, but not because of 
its chronological place, but rather it depends on its relation to the other moments in terms 
of affection. The material world that consists of images becomes the trigger and duration 
moves by the tension of the past. As a simple act inside the subject, which carries the 
trace of the past up until today, intuition enables the continuity of memory. As a result, 
the immobile empirical perception becomes mobile, on the ground of memory.  
The way Bergson speaks about the past and future and their relation to memory is 
different than Augustine’s account of time, which is the product of the mind. Augustine 
argues that the past and the future are only present while the subject is thinking about 
them in the present moment. Bergson also talks about the present as something that 
happens by association of past memories and the images of the past within the memory. 
In both of them, time seems variable and determined by the subject. But Bergson 
mentions two kinds of memories. One is the habitual-memory, which is the memory of 
the empirical perception and the other one is the pure-memory, which is intuitive and is 
always variable. Unlike habitual memory, which is chronologically ordered, intuitive 
memory is subject to change based on the affection of the subject. Bergson’s concept of 
memory is never the memory that memorizes and learns the needs of daily life, but rather 
it is a kind of sense memory, which can interact and be altered. It is pure-memory which 
realizes the alteration of the metaphysical movement of duration. However, the kind of 
memory Augustine refers to is more like the habitual memory. The mind collects the past 
and the future as memories of daily life and expectations within the empirical reality.  
The memory Bergson talks about is variable not only because the future becomes the 
present and the present turns into the past, but also because of the fact that real-time is the 
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internal affection within pure-memory and it can effect the reality of past memories. 
That’s why duration is utterly subjective. Duration is pure affection, which moves by the 
tension of the past as an inclination toward something, thus it can always change. The 
real process happens metaphysically and relative to the subject. 
Within myself a process of organization or interpenetration of conscious states is going 
on, which constitutes true duration.33  
Duration as the flow of time becomes the subject itself because it is the becoming of 
the subject that is in constant alteration. Therefore we perceive this metaphysical intuition 
as the uttermost subjectivity. But such subjectivity is temporal more than anything, 
because duration is a temporal value, which means that duration is the temporal 
subjectivity. This internal time is the flow of consciousness: the continuity of one’s 
immanence to one’s self that is in a continuous progress. In the end, duration is the 
consciousness of the self that is in motion. Thus the kind of motion, which pure duration 
describes, is a movement that is in the everlasting and metaphysical: 
. . . in the human soul there are only processes.34 
In fact, along with time, Bergson does not accept movement and change as real, 
because everything that refers to process in the material world is an illusion for him. 
Bergson defines the material world as the same process as Aristotle’s, which relies on 
perception and analytical knowledge. However he does not find reality in analytical 
perception, it is in the intuitive one. Bergson believes that the material world consists of 
representations, which are images. They are less than objects, because images are the 
result of the empirical perception process. In such perception we translate symbols as 
those we see from our fixed point of view while revolving around the object and taking                                                         
33 Ibid., p. 108 
34 Ibid., p. 131 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snap shots. We line those discontinuous, immobile snapshots back to back, as successive 
moments. By adding these immobile sections as the positions in space or instants in time, 
the abstract idea of a succession occurs.  
Bergson in Creative Evolution calls this process cinematographic illusion, because 
how the intellect approaches reality is similar to how motion is created in the 
cinematographic-image:  
Instead of attaching ourselves to the inner becoming of things, we place ourselves 
outside of them in order to recompose their becoming artificially. We take snapshots, as 
it were, of the passing reality. . . We may therefore sum up . . . that the mechanism of 
our ordinary knowledge is of a cinematographical kind.35  
According to his analogy, intellect can never communicate with reality because 
intellect, with its analytical approach, resembles the cinematographic-image that consists 
of immobile sections. Thus the motion and alteration of the material world are illusions 
as well as time. What is real is the metaphysical motion of duration and its qualitative 
alterations. It is indivisible but is also particular for everyone. On the one hand it is the 
part of the whole, on the other, it is the most radical subjectivity that is singular to each 
and every subject. It is in this sense that real time is the multiplicity of durations.  
It is clear that Bergson believes time is different than duration. Time, as we know it, 
is the representation of pure duration via space. Real-time cannot be represented since it 
is an intuition. However, when we want to express it, we reflect it to space and call it 
time, because intuition is not something that can be represented. Space becomes the 
vehicle in this representation and as a result of that, time is read via the motion of space. 
Since time is such a representation and it is not real, Bergson’s duration points out the 
                                                        
35 Bergson, Henri‐Louis. 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Evolution. Mitchell, Arthur. Cosimo 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Inc. 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332 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falsity of time. Thus time that is successive and homogeneous is not real. On the other 
hand, ‘real and psychological time’ is not time; it is duration.  
Then time as the origin of cinema must be presented in the cinematographic-image, 
not as the spatialization of duration but rather as the most radical subjectivity. As we have 
mentioned, approaching time as if it is a multiplicity of different times is in the ontic 
principle of the cinematographic-image. In regard to duration there is such multiplicity. 
In a way, each and every cinematographic-image can transmit duration as the temporal 
subjectivity of the image. Thus in spite of Bergson’s analogy of the cinematographic-
image, such images have the possibility to convey duration. In the following chapter I 
will investigate the cinematographic-image and explain the kind of subjectivity it 
proposes. This will demonstrate more clearly how time (duration) manifests itself in the 
cinematographic-image and what the structure of such an image consists of.  
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3.  THE CINEMATOGRAPHIC-IMAGE 
 
 
“The image itself is the system of the relationships of time  
from which the variable present only flows.”36 
Gilles Deleuze 
 
 
All arts have their own artistic forms. As we have already mentioned, for visual arts, 
still image is that form. On the other hand, the artistic form can be melody – as in music – 
or art can be in the structure of drama – as in theatre and acting. When we inquire about 
cinema, the cinematographic-image reveals itself as the artistic form of cinema. Then we 
need to ask what the cinematographic-image is. Is it merely visual? Is it a single image or 
composition of images? Where does sound fit in it? What defines its form? Which 
element of the cinematographic-image transmits the aesthetic value and its origin to the 
spectator? In this chapter we will answer these questions while investigating the nature 
and the structure of the cinematographic-image. In the end, if we can detect time within 
the nature and the structure of the cinematographic-image, then we will also investigate if 
time constitutes the origin of cinema as well.  
3.1. THE NATURE OF THE CINEMATOGRAPHIC-IMAGE  
What is the nature of the cinematographic-image? When we question the nature of it, 
we do not look at what the image tells us within its context. For example, film theories 
question what the cinematographic-image tells us via the visible. They investigate the 
perception of space, lighting, colors and the form of the image, via the design of the set or 
the style of the character. However, the nature of the cinematographic-image should be in 
relation to its origin and it should be same for all the captured moving images, beyond the                                                         
36 Deleuze, Gilles. Cinema 2: The Time‐Image. Tomlinson, Hugh & Galeta, Robert. London: Continuum International 
Publishing, 2005. p. xii 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intentions of its creator, i.e. the created moving image has to have the same nature no 
matter what. 
We have already mentioned that the cinematographic-image was created only visually 
(without sound). In modern cinema, however, the cinematographic-image cannot be 
imagined without sound. Sound design of a film can be very important and change the 
mood of the film. What does sound communicate that was already in the moving picture 
since the invention of it? Deleuze argues that there was a readable speech-act 
communicated via the visible such as body language in silent movies. A speech-act is an 
act that a speaker performs when making an utterance and, according to Deleuze, it is 
what has been shown in silent movies as an alternative language to the linguistic 
language, because only a visual form of communication was possible. In silent movies 
everything was transmitted by and through the visible. There was a visual conversation 
and an exchange between people. Thus speech-act was seen in the image because it 
traces a path in the visual image. With the invention of sound in cinema, what was once 
shown started to be heard in plain dialogue in the form of and functioning through the act 
of speech. However, as well as visible, sound also developed very quickly in cinema and 
we started to hear more than just the speech-act.  
The sound component of the cinematographic-image is more than just dialogues. 
Sound in cinema is the composition of pieces of noise, dialogue, voice-over, music and 
silence. The most important aspect of sound in cinema that separates it from theatre or 
radio series is its reference to an out-of-field angle. The term out-of-field is a Deleuzian 
concept and it refers to the sound of what is not visible. 
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It refers to what is neither seen nor understood, but is nevertheless perfectly present.37 
We can consider this out-of-field as not only the spatial atmosphere but as the 
signification of the inner world as well. Sound dwells in this world.  
It is true that it is not sound that invents the out-of-field, but it is sound which dwells in 
it, and which fills the visual not-seen with a specific presence.38  
Inner world here means the un-empirical, sensational world of the image. This state 
of sensational subjectivity is the underlying reality of the image. In fact even though the 
sound in the cinematographic-image is most likely spatial, which means it appears as the 
sound of something, it is also an important tool to represent the un-empirical reality of the 
image. In regard to acting, such inner world can be transmitted as the action. If it is the 
lifeless object that is in the image, then such sensational subjectivity transmits with an 
extra value, with light, color etc. However, with sound entering to cinema the inner world 
of the image has the potential to be heard, the way visible speech-act of the silent movies 
started to be heard. Thus sound in the cinematographic-image, no matter what the image 
is, adds an extra value and communicates outside the empirical world of which we most 
likely see in the visual component of the cinematographic-image. Again as we have 
already said, sound has the potential to manifest the sensational subjectivity of the image. 
Inner world of the image however, is always in a process. As in Bergson’s concept of 
becoming, it is not possible to divide sensational subjectivity within a quantitative 
manner. The image, like the becoming of the self, processes through qualitative 
alterations of the inner world of the cinematographic-image. Therefore there is an 
everlasting motion and continuum in the cinematographic-image as well. This is exactly 
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what Deleuze calls sound continuum. Sound continuum is the uncut flow of sound from 
one piece to another by an overlap or by crossing and cutting between the pieces.  In 
modern cinema there is an atmospheric sound, which actually holds the rest of the 
soundtrack together and conditions the continuum. All the elements of sound form a 
continuum as something belonging to the visual image and it is never a kind of signifier 
for the visible, but rather it is an important component. For example, in live performances 
there exists no sound continuum, so sound cannot gain visibility, i.e. cannot be realized as 
an image. That could be the reason why live performances cannot create the same 
response with cinema. In the case of cinema, sound gains visibility. 
. . . the talkie, the sound film are heard, but as a new dimension of the visual image, a 
new component. It is even for this reason that they are image.39 
In other words, image in modern cinema is an audio-visual image. This image has 
sound image and visual image as one, but sound and visual can exist separately as a 
cinematographic-image as well. That means the nature of the cinematographic-image 
could be read from the sound component as well as the visual. In terms of sound 
component the nature is the continuum via out-of-field references. If that is the case then 
via sound we experience an alternative perception in continuum, which is the opposite of 
our discontinuous empirical perception.  
In our perception of the empirical world, there is no true continuity and everything is 
perceived in parts. Such a continuous world dwells only in mathematical reality and 
analytic knowledge. Some of the famous paradoxes of Zeno of Elea, the most important 
scholar of Parmenides, reveals that it is logically impossible and incompatible to establish 
any sort of correlation between empirical and mathematical reality because the former 
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lacks continuity due to the way perception works, that is, it can never be experienced as a 
continuous whole. Zeno created these paradoxes in the form of antinomies to support 
Parmenides’ doctrines: for him all was one indivisible, unchanging reality, and any 
appearances to the contrary were illusions, to be dispelled by reason. 
Parmenides, who lived in the early 5th century (BC), rejects pluralism and the reality 
of any kind of change. He argues that being (that which is) is one, indivisible and 
unchanging and any appearances to the contrary are illusions to be dispelled by reason. 
Zeno, in many of his paradoxes, in order to ground and defend Parmenides’ position, 
questions motion. These paradoxes show the impossibility of movement within our sense 
perception by attacking such axioms as “every finite unit can divide into infinite units”, 
or “it is not possible to traverse or make contact with unlimited things individually in a 
limited time” and concludes that motion is not possible. For example, even if we take the 
fastest runner, since every finite unit can be divided into infinite units, when this runner 
starts to run, there will be infinite numbers of finite units for him to run. Hence supposing 
every time he steps further, he is still left with an infinite number of finite distances to 
run. Logically this would take infinite amount of time and therefore can go on forever. 
Hence, the runner, let alone passing any other competitor or finishing the race, cannot 
even start the race. Since the infinite numbers of unit can never be passed, neither 
movement nor change can occur. If this is the empirical world and if motion cannot take 
place, then what do we experience?  
By arguing that motion is not possible in the empirical world, Zeno tries to prove that 
such empirical world is false. According to Parmenides, too, such a physical world was 
false. The real world was ‘one being’ that is an unchanging and indivisible whole. Thus 
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Parmenides believed that truth cannot be reached by sensory perception. What we 
experience as motion is just an illusion. If that is the case, then the empirical and 
mathematical world cannot be the real one. The real world should be indivisible and an 
unchanging ‘one being’. 
David Hume’s analysis of induction and causality, more than two millennia later, 
makes it clear that we do not “really” experience the world as a whole. We experience it 
in parts. This partial perception seems like a whole due to our habits of thinking. 
Induction is a universal affirmative proposition, such as ‘all swans are white’. However, 
without seeing all swans that existed and will exist, we cannot make the assumption that 
all swans are white. According to Hume, in order to have such an induction, we should 
assume  
that instances of which we have had no experience, must resemble those of which we 
have had experience, and that the course of nature continues always uniformly the 
same.40 
However, it is impossible to provide an experiential/perceptual grounding to this 
claim. Hume argues that the same empirically unfounded assumption is present in the 
concept of causality, in the notion of establishing a constant conjunction between two 
types of events as cause and effect. This relation is not a logical one but rather, by 
depending on the experience we assume there is a cause and effect relation. Such kind of 
human reasoning he calls matters of fact:  
All reasonings concerning matters of fact seem to be founded on the relation of cause 
and effect. By means of that relation alone we can go beyond the evidence of our 
memory and senses. If you were to ask a man, why he believes any matter of fact, 
which is absent, he would give you a reason, and this reason would be some other fact.41 
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Hume, 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A 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Publishing 2010. 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Hume, David. 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We have, on the other hand, propositions that are discoverable by reason, without 
depending on its real existence in the universe. Such propositions are called relations of 
ideas. Since experience is the only way of gaining knowledge, Hume applies his 
empiricist view to causality as well. Instead of taking the notion of causality for granted, 
Hume challenges us to consider what experience allows us to recognize as cause and 
effect. If there are two instances, where the two always occur together and one of them 
causes the other, then whenever the first one occurs, the other one would be expected to 
occur, as well. Meaning they would be constantly conjoined with a cause and effect 
relation.  
In An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, he uses the example of billiard 
balls to prove the impossibility of cause and effect relation.  
When I see, for instance, a billiard ball moving in a straight line towards another; even 
suppose motion in the second ball should by accident be suggested to me, as the result 
of their contact or impulse, may I not conceive, that a hundred different events might as 
well follow from the cause? May not both these balls remain at absolute rest? May not 
the first ball return in a straight line, or leap off from the second in any line or direction? 
All these suppositions are consistent and conceivable. Why then should we give the 
preference to one, which is no more consistent or conceivable than the rest? All our 
reasoning a priori will never be able to show us any foundation for this preference. In a 
word, then, every effect is a distinct event from its cause and the first invention or 
conception of it, a priori, must be entirely arbitrary.42  
Thus Hume concludes that 
. . . there appears not, throughout all nature, any one instance of connexion which is 
conceivable by us. All events seem entirely loose and separate. One event follows 
another; but we can never observe any tie between them. They seemed conjoined, but 
never connected.43  
If we don’t truly experience the tie between them, then we can’t experience the 
interval. In the case of Zeno’s paradox and in the case of the billiard balls, this interval, 
which we cannot experience, is movement. And movement as we know seems only to be                                                         
42 Ibid., p. 20 
43 Morris, Herbert. Freedom and Responsibility. California: Stanford University Press 1961. p. 71 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an illusion; therefore the world as we know it is actually partial and discontinuous, thus 
reality is not within empirical perception. 
If the empirical world is discontinuous, then the kind of continuum we experience in 
the cinematographic-image via sound could be experienced through the intuitive 
perception, the metaphysical phenomena we discussed in the analysis of the basics of 
Bergsonian metaphysics. In Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, Deleuze argues that for 
Bergson, movement is missed in two ways.  
On the one hand, you can bring two instants or two positions together to infinity; but 
movement will always occur in the interval between the two… On the other hand, 
however much you divide and subdivide time, movement will always occur in a 
concrete duration; thus each movement will have its own qualitative duration.44  
What Deleuze means here is that even though Bergson thinks that the world consists 
of immobile images, movement will always be in the interval, and this interval has its 
own distinction from the rest. However, the difference is not quantitative, but rather 
something qualitative, thus concrete duration is interval’s distinct quality.  
Bergson’s process ontology explains the concept of movement with qualitative 
alterations and as metaphysical phenomena. We cannot see change in terms of numbers 
or before and after, but more like the inner change, or rather becoming. With these 
metaphysical alterations the real movement occurs. Bergson argues that an object from a 
material world can have mobile alterations if a person can focus on the object’s place in 
the memory instead of the perception of it. As a matter of fact, for Bergson, real 
movement occurs by the association of the past within the memory. His concept of 
memory is never the memory that memorizes and learns the needs of daily life, but rather 
it is a kind of an intuitive memory, which can interact with and alter itself.                                                           
44 Deleuze, Gilles. Cinema 1: The Movement‐Image (1983).  Tomlinson, Hugh 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Habberjam, Barbara. 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Bergson talks about two kinds of memories. One is the habitual-memory, which 
works within the sensory-motor mechanism, and the other one is the pure-memory. Pure-
memory is an intuitive process and is always variable. The first one is in the service of 
physical survival, and that is the memory of empirical perception. The second one is the 
memory of intuition. As a simple act inside the subject, which carries the trace of the past 
to today, intuition enables the continuity of such memory.  The immobile sections of the 
perception process become mobile on the ground of memory. Bergson says these images 
are snapshots and instead of concentrating their spatiality, concentrating to their 
temporality with memory, the metaphysical movement happens. Subject is also in 
alteration and in constant becoming since intuitive process is merely internal and happens 
by memory. According to Bergsonian process ontology, the real movement is not the 
alteration of things but rather, as the everlasting-metaphysical movement it is the 
alteration of the self. Movement of matter in the physical world regarding to our 
empirical perception is not possible and therefore what we experience is just an illusion 
of movement. Thus change is not in terms of quantity but rather in terms of quality.  
We have mentioned in the chapter of the concept of time that the cinematographic-
image seems to work in a very similar vein with the intellect. Bergson’s description of 
how ordinary knowledge is attained is a proof of that. 
Instead of attaching ourselves to the inner becoming of things, we place ourselves 
outside of them in order to recompose their becoming artificially. We take snapshots, as 
it were, of the passing reality . . . We may therefore sum up . . . that the mechanism of 
our ordinary knowledge is of a cinematographical kind.45  
For Bergson the cinematographic-image is an analogy on how the intellect 
approaches reality. In cinema movement occurs along with static images. Hence, 
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according to his analogy, intellect can never communicate with reality because intellect, 
with its analytical approach, resembles the cinematographic-image that consists of 
immobile sections. If that is the case then movement in the cinematographic-image is 
false movement and the same as our intellect, therefore the cinematographic-image 
cannot represent reality. In spite of that, movement appears as the unique element of the 
visual component of the cinematographic-image since its invention.  
The visual component of the cinematographic-image is the composition of light, 
color, depth, form and movement. The other visual arts such as painting, photography or 
sculpture cannot imitate movement. Also performance arts, such as acting or dance, 
which can be realized within motion, do not re-create movement as in cinema. In 
performance arts, movement of the performer is a mere reality happening in front of our 
own eyes in real time. In cinema, movement is something that is created or captured, 
which offers an alternative present instead of real time (real time here does not mean 
duration, it means that the action happens at the same time we see it). Thus no matter 
what, movement is the unique visual component of the cinematographic-image.  
If it is only false movement that is in the image, then we should be able to explain the 
visual only with a technical approach, i.e. by explaining how we empirically perceive this 
false movement. In fact, as we mentioned before, for a long time, the mind’s persistence 
of vision was the answer to how we experience movement in cinema. According to the 
persistence of vision, if the person looks at an image long enough, then after the image 
disappears, the vision of the image still remains. In regard to cinematic illusion, if the 
snapshots can move fast enough, then the eye won’t see the blank (space) between the 
two snapshots. Eyes can only recognize movement.  
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However, this theory becomes inadequate in time due to new scientific inventions. In 
1912, Max Wertheimer, a Czech-born psychologist, proposes a new theory that justifies 
the cinematographic illusion. He argues that the mind has two kinds of perceptual 
illusions: phi phenomenon and beta movement. These optical illusions happen as the 
optic nerve’s response to light and as a result of un-existing information. A number of 
questions emerge: is the cinematographic-image only an optical illusion? Is the optical 
illusion the effect of the cinematographic-image? Is it because real time performances 
lack optical illusions that they cannot produce the same effect as cinema?  
German-American psychologist Hugo Münsterberg (1863–1916) argues that there is 
a unique aspect in cinema, which lets all suggestions such as depth, motion, etc. to be 
considered and registered as real. In The Photoplay: A Psychological Study, he examines 
the psychological factors involved in watching silent “moving pictures”. First, he points 
out the differences between photoplay (cinema) and theatre in terms of depth and 
movement. In fact, while theatre has three dimensions, photoplay is just a flat picture.  
However, it has the possibility of not being just a picture.  
That flatness is an objective part of the technical physical arrangements, but not a 
feature of that which we really see in the performance of the photoplay. We are there in 
the midst of a three-dimensional world, and the movements of the persons or of the 
animals or even of the lifeless things, like the streaming of the water in the brook or the 
movements of the leaves in the wind, strongly maintain our immediate impression of 
depth.46  
He argues that everything we see on the screen is our own creation. After the 
associations we make, we create depth in the flat screen and we create the movement of 
immobile snapshots. A movie is actually an ongoing movement of snapshots on a 
celluloid film and the image can only suggest movement. Thus movement in the  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cinematographic-image that is the result of successive alterations is just an illusion, as in 
the material world. 
According to Münsterberg’s approach to cinema, in spite of the direct relation 
between technology and cinema, technology is only a medium for the ontic principle that 
conditions the cinematographic-image, and it cannot relate to the nature of the 
cinematographic-image or explain how all the suggestions are registered as real. In the 
end, technical approach may be able to explain how the illusion of motion is created but, 
for example, cannot explain how the flat screen is registered as if it is three-dimensional.  
Moreover, in the sound and visual components of cinema, we conceive a metaphysical 
reality. The capacity of a flat screen to communicate through the suggestions it proposes 
is a metaphysical phenomenon. Thus, due to the captured alternative present, what we 
actually experience by false movement is the continuity of the internal process, which is 
in real alteration and real motion. Because of this false movement, photoplay is registered 
as if it is three-dimensional. In the end, cinema and the cinematographic-image is the 
practice of signs and images; it is a practice, which inevitably incorporates the viewer to 
the process as an active participant and ends with his or her interaction. It is never a mere 
technical phenomenon. Thus, any kind of optical illusion or the mind’s cinematographic 
process cannot comprehensively explain the nature of the cinematographic-image. Then 
the question is: how can false movement disclose real movement? 
Hugo Münsterberg thinks it is actually time, which appears as another dimension and 
which enables all other suggestions to be possible. In fact the nature of continuum and 
movement are not so different to each other and they both refer to time. Moving image is 
an image that unfolds in time and continuum is basically time passing. Either as empirical 
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illusion or metaphysical reality, both movement and continuum are inevitably in time. If 
we say movement and continuum are happening in the cinematographic-image as a 
metaphysical phenomenon, then time should also be experienced not only as subjective 
time, but also as pure duration. Pure duration is the flow of consciousness: the continuity 
of one’s immanence to one’s self that is in continuous progress. Thus, it only has 
qualitative alteration within its progress. This metaphysical phenomenon, which is 
indivisible in terms of units and heterogeneous, becomes time, when we want to express 
it. Pure duration can only be experienced via sympathy and intuition. In pure duration, 
motion and alteration belong to the inner self and they are everlasting, thus also 
metaphysical and intuitive.  
In the chapters The Concept of Time and The Ontic Principle of The 
Cinematographic-image, we mentioned that the ontic principle of the cinematographic-
image calls for the multiplicity of time. Because each and every image starts a new time 
series and when it finishes the series ends. It is the multiplicity of duration, which can 
reflect such a principle. If we take the above point into account, now we can say that the 
kind of time series a cinematographic-image opens is not in quantitative manner, but 
rather as the concrete duration, within its own distinct quality. Therefore the way the 
cinematographic-image captures time is very different from any other kind of art.  
Photography also captures time, but the cinematographic-image is different than 
plainly capturing time. André Bazin (1918 - 1958), French film theorist and film critic, in 
his book What Is Cinema?, argues that photography brings a new side to realism: 
Hence the charm of family albums. Those grey or sepia shadows, phantomlike and 
almost undecipherable, are no longer traditional family portraits but rather the 
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disturbing presence of lives halted at a set moment in their duration, freed from their 
destiny…47  
Bazin asserts that such a work of art embalms time in the image because reality of the 
image comes from its ability of capturing the object’s time. Both photography and 
cinema can capture time, but there is a fundamental difference in the way they achieve 
this: Photography happens as an instant and it is static. It can’t move any further. 
However, in cinema, a moving picture that is in continuum fabricates another reality. 
Such reality is of a temporal nature.  
Now for the first time, the image of things is likewise the image of their duration, 
change mummified as it were.48  
Therefore cinema is the objectivity of time. In other words, that cinematographic-
image does not capture time necessarily as a moment limited to one static shot, like 
photography, but rather as it’s passing, as something in motion and thus, in continuum is 
what distinguishes cinematography from photography. In a photo we can never 
experience image that is unfolding in time, but in the cinematographic-image we 
encounter an alternative time perception that is in continuity. For example in photography 
the image is perceived as a part of our perception, in our reality and in our time. 
However, in cinema, the image is perceived with another perception with its own reality, 
and its own time. Such power to create an alternative perception is the nature of the 
cinematographic-image and time is what is perceived. Tarkovsky emphasizes this 
cinematic capability:  
For the first time in the history of the arts, in the history of culture, man found the 
means to take an impression of time.49  
                                                        
47 Bazin, Andre. What is Cinema? Gray, Hugh. California: University of California Press, 2005. p. 14  
48 Ibid. p. 15 
49 Tarkovsky, Andrey. Sculpting In Time. Hunter‐Blair, Kitty. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2003. p. 62  
  72 
Unlike photography, with the cinematographic-image this impression of time isn’t a 
defined moment but it is the temporal subjectivity of real-time, duration. By 
spatialization of what is temporal, as its nature, the cinematographic-image offers an 
alternative perception, in which we experience duration and we experience movement 
and continuum as metaphysical happenings. Everything that is temporal and internal 
becomes spatial and then re-temporalizes again through this spatialization. In cinema 
with such spatialization a new kind of perception is created. This cinematic perception is 
fundamentally more complex than, and potentially opposed to, our empirical perception, 
which is tainted with spatial and temporal discontinuity. It also contains the conditions of 
possibility of a new form of subjectivity because it offers a new vantage point for 
another, radically different subject/object relationship. The structure of the 
cinematographic-image will show us how such perception of time is conveyed to the 
viewer and explain the new subjectivity it offers.  
3.2. THE STRUCTURE OF THE CINEMATOGRAPHIC-IMAGE 
How do we experience time in the cinematographic-image? The answer lies in its 
structure. The very same answer also reveals how the cinematographic-image 
communicates its origin and meaning to the viewer. This again isn’t about what the 
image tells us but in which structure it reaches out, no matter what the object of the image 
is. For a long time the cinematographic-image was analyzed in connection with 
semiotics, because since the first narrative, films were analyzed by the relation of images. 
It is true that cinema is the practice of signs and images, and due to this, within the 
cinematographic-image there has to be a kind of sign functioning or a kind of referential 
structure, but is this the structure of classical semiotics?  
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Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure (1857 – 1913) lays the foundation for semiotics 
and points out linguistic sign functioning. Saussure argues that in language words are 
types of signs. A word, namely a sign, as a signifier, signifies what it stands for, and that 
is referred to as the signified. That which is signified is the concept or the object that a 
sign refers to. The theory of semiotics is not limited to just linguistics, rather, it can be 
valid for any kind of sign. In fact, the history of film theory relies on the sign functioning 
of the signifier and the signified. With the practice of semiology, classical film theory 
shifts to classical film semiotics and linguistics is applied to the practice of images and 
signs. Thus the semiology of cinema is the discipline that applies linguistic models to 
images as constituting to its principals.  
The use of linguistic semiology starts with the structuralist film theory. Structuralist 
film theory is a branch of film theory that is rooted in structuralism, which is based on 
structural linguistics itself. The structuralist film theory emphasizes how films convey 
meaning through the use of codes and conventions, which is similar to the way languages 
are used to construct meaning in communication. Film semioticians justify using 
structural linguistics to study cinema by saying that natural language and cinematic 
language have a resemblance that emphasizes the underlying reality of the images. 
According to such theory, as in language, cinematic language also has its codes, a system 
of signs and conventions, i.e. cinematic language builds on the relation between the 
signified and the signifier. 
French film theorist Christian Metz (1931 – 1993) argues that since cinema is 
constituted within a narrative as an historical fact, then images, in fact every shot, is 
reduced to a proposition or a kind of oral utterance. If that is the case, then the smallest 
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unit of linguistics is missing: word. A shot can only be considered as a ‘sentence’ such as 
‘man is walking’. In fact according to Metz linguistic semiotics cannot be applied to the 
cinematographic-image, because images are un-coded. Un-coded here means that “the 
image becomes what it shows, to the extent that it does not have to signify it anymore.” 
Thus the shot turns into expression rather than signification. Expressiveness is the 
expressiveness of the world, and according to Metz this is what is done in cinema. 
‘Meaning’ naturally derives from the signifier without resorting to a code. Therefore, a 
language system, which is a highly organized code, does not explain what cinema is.  
Language, on the other hand, covers broader areas. Saussure, for example, explains 
language as the combination of language system and speech. Metz, who considers a 
‘shot’ a way of speech (since it is a sentence), argues that cinema is a language, but is 
different from verbal language. Syntax of such language is a syntactical one and done 
through montage.  
The moment of ordering (montage) in film is somehow more important—linguistically 
at least—than the choosing of the images (cutting).50  
He argues that art in cinema starts with the visual and it continues on the level of 
sequence or of the composed shot. Therefore for Metz an image is always a kind of 
speech but it is not a unit of a language system. Montage’s act of ordering creates 
syntactical-basis syntax and not a morphological one. Thereon the ‘cinematographic 
language’ begins.   
Deleuze, on the other hand, argues that cinema is not a language. It is a new practice 
of images and signs, which can produce conceptual objects: 
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Cinema is not a universal or a primitive language system [langue], nor a language 
[langage]. It brings to light an intelligible content, which is like a preposition, a 
condition, a necessary correlate through which language constructs its own ‘objects’ 
(signifying units and operations).51  
In this sense the referential structure of the cinematographic-image echoes American 
philosopher and mathematician Charles Sanders Pierce’s (1839 – 1914) triad semiotics, 
which is an alternative to Saussure’s dual semiotics. In Pierce’s semiotics, there is a 
triadic system of sign functioning between “sign” “object” and “interpretant.” According 
to what Peirce calls “the sign relation”, the sign (also called the representamen) is the 
term that is ordinarily said to represent or mean something. Signs are qualities, relations, 
features, items, events, states, regularities, habits, laws, and so on, which have meanings, 
significances, or interpretations. The object is what ordinarily would be said to be the 
“thing” meant or signified or represented by the sign, what the sign is a sign of. The 
interpretant of a sign is said by Peirce to be that to which the sign represents the object. 
However, what exactly Peirce means by the interpretant is difficult to pin down.  
It is something like a mind, a mental act, a mental state, or a feature or quality of mind; 
at all events the interpretant is something ineliminably mental. . . . The interpretant of a 
sign, by virtue of the very definition Peirce gives of the sign-relation, must itself be a 
sign, and a sign moreover of the very same object that is (or was) represented by the 
(original) sign. In effect, then, the interpretant is a second signifier of the object, only 
one that now has an overtly mental status. But, merely in being a sign of the original 
object, this second sign must itself have (Peirce uses the word “determine”) an 
interpretant, which then in turn is a new, third sign of the object, and again is one with 
an overtly mental status. And so on.52  
According to Pierce, if there is any sign at all of any object, then there is an infinite 
sequence of signs of that same object. So, everything in the world of appearances, which 
he calls “the phaneron,” and which consists entirely of signs, being a sign itself, begins an 
infinite sequence of mental interpretants of an object. The key point of Pierce’s semiotics  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is that the interpretant has a similar relation to the object with the object’s original 
representamen and therefore the interpretant becomes a representamen to another 
interpretant. That is, if there is a sign there is an infinite sequence of representations of an 
object and an infinite circulation. Thinking, for example, is a process of sign 
interpretation, because thoughts consist of signs. Thoughts, which follow the law of 
mental associations, suggest something to a following thought. As a result, the former 
thought becomes a sign to the next thought. Every single thought is interpreted by 
another thought; in a sense, they feed off each other. In fact no thought can occur in an 
instant. In time, thoughts continuously follow one after the other, like a moment. 
Therefore within different moments there are different thoughts. This is the principle of 
continuity of thought as stated by Pierce, because there is a never-ending cycle of 
interpretation.  
Pierce’s semiotics is critical for our purposes because it provides a philosophical 
explanation and critical understanding of how duration manifests itself in the 
cinematographic-image. In the cinematographic-image we experience time within a 
referential structure that is singular to the image, but also derives meaning in connection 
to the “interpretant”.  Pierce’s sign relation justifies that the real subject of the 
cinematographic-image should be the effect of the interpretant(s) that create(s) the 
function of signs. If we say that the cinematographic-image has such triad referential 
structure then the subjectivity of the cinematographic-image cannot be defined simply by 
the difference between subject and object.  
According to Münsterberg’s analysis, in terms of the cinematographic-image there 
are only suggestions. It means that, there has to be an interpreter for all suggestions on 
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movement, depth, etc. to signify something and to become real. If the interpretant is the 
viewer and the representamen is the image, as the result of viewing the image, the 
interpretant will have a similar relation to the object with the object’s original 
representamen. Following this, the interpretant, the mental content created by the viewer 
upon seeing the image, becomes a representamen to another interpretant. This 
interpretant, which interprets the viewer’s thoughts, is the image. After the interpretation 
of the subject or the mental content created by the subject the cinematographic-image that 
is in motion and in continuum flows within the perception of the viewer and it becomes 
the representamen again.  
As a result of this triad sign functioning, an everlasting circulation occurs within the 
mind of a single viewer. Therefore the relationship of the cinematographic-image to what 
is represented will always be the result of the endless relation of the cinematographic-
image to its interpreter. The formal or structural relations of these images, which would 
include their relation to what they stand for and who interprets them, would be the 
singular syntax of the cinematographic-image.  
Duration manifests itself within the cinematographic-image via this syntax. At this 
point, Bergson’s concept of sympathy and duration are very important. According to 
him, conceiving the object by going into it, by sympathy, actually happens by going into 
one’s own self, i.e. by feeling sympathy towards one’s self. Such sympathy can expand to 
others heterogeneously. If a person can concentrate enough on the sympathy towards 
one’s self, in order to conceive it, this person can locate himself within the duration, and 
expand to the absolute duration.  The cinematographic-image may not be able to express 
duration (since when it is expressed it becomes time) but can create such affective 
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inclination. This will help the viewer to concentrate his/her own duration and the present 
becomes variable. The captured past re-plays in the present time, which creates the 
viewer’s present through his/her private memories/past. Deleuze explains this as the flow 
of present:  
It is not quite right to say that the cinematographic image is in the present. What in the 
present is, what the image ‘represents’ but not the image itself… The image itself is the 
system of the relationships of time from which the variable present only flows.53  
According to him, the temporality of the variable present of the image cannot be 
defined simply with the chronological present-past-future relations and by their 
alterations. Even though the captured past is becoming the present of the viewer, while 
the present is constantly moving towards the past, it does not explain the flow of present. 
Instead through the referential structure of the cinematographic-image the flow of present 
can be explained. It is because what is in the present is never the image itself, but what it 
‘represents’. If the referential structure of the image is the cycling interpretation of the 
viewer and the cinematographic-image, then it is this relation that creates the variable 
present. This motion of present is only perceptible by the subject and it is relative to 
subject.  In this case the flow of present is in a metaphysical sense and the alterations of 
the variable present is in qualitative manner. This ‘variable present’ is temporal 
subjectivity. It is as if the duration of the image and the duration of the spectator are 
interpreting each other within an everlasting cycle and are creating a new memory.  
In fact, in the cinematographic-image, the concept of memory regarding time and 
duration transforms. We deal with the mutual-memory of the image and the private-
memory of the viewer. Mutual-memory is the cinematographic-image’s referential 
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structure, which is singular but also shared by everyone who watches it, therefore making 
it mutual. On the other hand, private-memory is not just the personal history of the 
viewer, which differs for every each person, but it is also the pure-memory, which means 
it is always changing. The syntax of the image is within the common grounds of these 
two kinds of memories, because in the cinematographic-image, there is a constant 
communication between the subject (viewer) and the object (the image) as the image 
continues. The viewer perceives triad sign functioning of the cinematographic-image as 
the immediate perception due to the immediate encounter of the constantly progressing 
image. As in Bergson’s phenomenology, object and subject become one, and the subject 
experiences the object by going into it, i.e. by sympathy.  
Tarkovsky explains this new subjectivity in a different way. He argues that through 
the poetic connections in cinema, feelings become heightened and the spectator becomes 
an active participant in the work. Poetic relationality creates an emotional space and 
especially helps the spectator to join the act of understanding life, since it does not 
present ready resolution nor does it depend on the writer’s demands. Tarkovsky points 
out that the spectator  
becomes a participant in the process of discovering life, unsupported by ready-made 
deductions from the plot or ineluctable pointers by the author. He has at his disposal 
only what helps to penetrate to the deeper meaning of the complex phenomena 
represented in front of him. Complexities of thought and poetic visions of the world do 
not have to be thrust into the framework of the patently obvious. The usual logic, that of 
linear sequentially, is uncomfortably like the proof of a geometry theorem.54  
This structure starts with the spatialization of everything that is temporal and internal 
in nature, as the immediate perception of the universe. Within the cinematographic-
image, due to such spatialization, a new kind of perception is created. First, data enters 
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with images and they are always immobile. Then within the memory, by reflecting the 
past to the present, the metaphysical movement, becoming, occurs. During this process, 
spatial output, the cinematographic-image, re-temporalizes with the participation of the 
spectator. Memory temporalizes the perception through qualitative alterations. The 
relation of the self with these images in the mind is the pinnacle subjectivity and it is 
temporal. In a way the spectator experiences himself within another time series, i.e. 
within another perception of time. Thus, the perception of the camera becomes the 
perception of a new subject. It is true that the cinematographic-image appears in space 
and time, but also in hyper-reality. The cinematographic-image creates an alternative 
perception, in which time is re-created as the immediate reflection of temporal 
subjectivity.  
Our analysis thus shows us how the cinematographic-image develops from being an 
immobile spatial shot into a kind of articulation of subjectivity through many channels. In 
the end, the structure of the cinematographic-image manifests itself as the structure of 
real-time, duration that is in metaphysical motion. As we have seen in the previous 
chapter, duration is something that is internal and expresses itself on the grounds of 
memory. In memory it turns into becoming with the constant interaction of the images. 
Such structure is present in every moving image, but does it work within cinema? Can a 
movie, as a work of art, reflect the structure or the nature of the cinematographic-image? 
Can it even reflect the origin of the cinematographic-image?  
In the following section, we will question the relation between the cinematographic-
image and cinematic impulses. If cinema’s origin is also time and if it also revolves 
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around time, then we will be able to determine whether time is the aesthetic value of 
cinema or not.  
3.3. CINEMATIC IMPULSES AND THE CINEMATOGRAPHIC-IMAGE  
In the first chapter we inquired about the ontic principle of the cinematographic-
image through its development. We saw that with the cinematographic-image man 
achieves mastery over time. In this chapter we investigated the nature and the structure of 
the cinematographic-image, which brought about the articulation of such concepts as 
movement, continuum and time. As a matter of fact, movement, which is in continuum, 
requires change and that only happens in the course of time, thus the origin of cinema 
reveals itself as time.  
We also saw in the previous chapters that such concepts as time, movement, and 
change, as long as they constitute a continuum, cannot be grounded on and justified by 
the perceptual experience of the empirical world. They only justify their reality within the 
framework of and in reference to qualitative processes. If that is the case, then in real life 
and in cinema, physical movement is false movement and time of the clock is abstract 
time. The real movement in cinema, as well as in the empirical perception, is a 
metaphysical kind. Therefore the cinematographic-image offers an alternative time 
perception. This perception enables the cinematographic-image to register as the 
temporal subjectivity. Such subjectivity is the real-time, duration. If duration is the origin 
of the cinematographic-image and also if it shapes its nature and its structure, then we 
need to explain how duration manifests itself in cinema. How does cinema maintain such 
effect of the cinematographic-image? And is there a possibility that cinema may reduce 
the effect of the cinematographic-image? 
  82 
According to Bergson, movies represent time but not duration because they are 
spatializing everything that is internal. As we have seen, Bergson argues that time, as in 
clock-time, is just a spatialization of real-time, duration. Real-time cannot be represented 
to the intellect and when it is, the intellect becomes a spatializing mechanism by nature.  
When film cameras were initially invented, the formal nature of the cinematographic-
image was very different than what it is today.  There was no sound, montage or a mobile 
camera eye but just fixed shots, which had the same apparatus as a projector. In fact, 
these films were still under the influence of theatre and photography. They were filmed 
from an immobile viewpoint, in which the film camera was just used as a passive 
recording device. Without understanding the aesthetical effect of the cinematographic-
image, the film camera, after its invention, was mostly used for plane documentations. 
The effect of first experiments such as The Arrival of a Train at the Station was lost 
within such desire to record reality. A fixed camera was filming the streets and urban life, 
but not with any subjectivity, rather as a mere recording device of the space and the 
motion within the space. On the other hand, if they filmed indoors, they used the film 
camera as the fourth wall, the same as the standpoint of the audience in the theatre. The 
angle never changed and it was seen as the space within three walls, just like a stage. In 
this early cinema, images were transmitted as spatial due to what it represented, which 
was movement and spatialized time.  
Therefore duration, real-time, which is the origin of the cinematographic-image, is 
communicated only when the cinematographic-image is and remains temporalized. 
Temporal image, the opposite of spatial image, represents the metaphysical alteration of 
the inner-self, i.e. it represents temporal subjectivity. Such “unempirical” alteration can 
  83 
be experienced in cinema only if the image stops being an imprint of space and transmits 
its duration. Deleuze in Cinema 1: The Movement-Image and Cinema 2: The Time-Image 
defines temporalized images as virtual and spatialized images as actual. Virtual can be 
define as having all of the properties of x while not necessarily being x. If this is the case, 
virtual image represents all the qualitative alterations, whereas actual image represents 
quantitative alterations. Therefore virtual image, which is temporal, communicates as the 
internal expression and cannot be actualized fully. On the other hand, actualized image is 
spatial and determined by the law(s) of nature. 
Virtual image (pure recollection) is not a psychological state or a consciousness: it 
exists outside of consciousness, in time.55  
Virtual image is not in connection to cognitive understanding of the image, but is 
rather like an inner circuit that connects to qualitative alterations of the inner-self, i.e. to 
duration. In fact virtual images carry the sign of the past, which is a sign of a temporal 
perspective, and they are actualized in relation to a new present created with the 
participation of the spectator. As virtual image, the cinematographic-image becomes a 
circuit between the past and the present, an internal circuit between the virtual and its 
actual. If that is the case, then temporal aspect reveals itself in cinema only if the film 
camera is used less as an objective recording device and more as a tool for an articulation 
of something that is internal. 
From that perspective, the most important invention in terms of the articulation of 
subjectivity in the history of cinema can be considered as the accidental discovery of the 
traveling shot. As a result of placing the fixed camera inside a boat it became mobile and 
the camera was moving through the landscape. This accidental discovery was actually re- 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discovering the principle of relativity, which is the chance of movement that is given to 
the absolute observer. According to German author, art and film theorist Rudolf 
Arnheim, (1904 – 2007) the process of discovering subjectivity in the objective recording 
of a machine is what proved cinema as a new art form. As a result of this, the film camera 
became more than a mechanical recording tool and it was re-discovered as a narrative 
tool. In fact with the “traveling gaze” of the mobile camera, cinema becomes something 
radically more complex and fundamentally different than an objective recording process: 
it now interprets its object, because the eye of the camera becomes a kind of 
consciousness that perceives and interprets constantly, as does the spectator.  
This subjectivity temporalizes the image, because it represents the inner duration of 
the image and it can expend heterogeneously to others. This means the subjectivity of the 
mobile viewpoint can expand to the spectator. By re-creating reality or by freeing the 
observer (the camera eye), spatial shots of the early silent era, which were solely 
recording urban life, become subjective and temporal again. More importantly, as people 
discovered and enjoyed the subjectivity of the cinematographic-image, the 
cinematographic-image established itself as a popular tool for narrative. After this point, 
cinema as narrative, as how we know it today, was formed around the art of the 
cinematographic-image.  
Within the narrative path, cinema parented two basic forms: a classical form and a 
modern form. In both forms, the cinematographic-image is used in different ways. Either 
cinema is taken as the art of such an image or the image is treated just as one of the 
blocks within the determined whole. In the former one the image has its own value and 
its own sensational subjectivity outside the whole work, thus, image forms the narrative. 
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On the other hand, in the latter one, without connection to the whole the image cannot 
communicate its own value. In such classical form, the plot as the narration shapes the 
image. We can experience modern forms in very old films and we can also experience 
classical forms in today’s films. It is not a matter of time or era, but just different 
approaches to the art of cinema. These two different impulses in cinema compass the 
effect of the cinematographic-image in two different forms. By investigating the classical 
and the modern forms of cinema we will attain if cinema reduces or increases the effect 
of the cinematographic-image. 
3.3.1. Classical Form  
The classical form of cinema due to its montage technique evolved as the result of 
narration. In the classical form, the plot of the movie molds the cinematic impulse, 
incident by incident, like a chain reaction. In fact classical form of cinema is conceived 
within a cognitive perception, and not intuitively. As the result of watching and 
understanding via mental processes, such work of cinema functions in organic nature.  
American filmmaker D. W. Griffith established the foundations of the classical form 
of cinema. Deleuze names Griffith’s editing technique as American Organic Montage. 
Deleuze considers Griffith’s montage to be “organic” because in his films shots are put in 
order to create natural relation between them and nothing artificial. They are combined 
according to sensory-motor schema, which is the empirical process of perception 
depending on the law of nature and not in any other way. Every shot is put in order just to 
define empirical perception of the character. Today’s invisible editing, where cuts are 
almost imperceptible, is the continuity of Griffith’s organic montage. In such films, it is 
our empirical perception that works in sensory-motor schema and functions within the 
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law of nature, i.e. it works through intellect. Since it is not against what the intellect 
expects, the viewer does not realize the cuts but rather concentrates on the plot of the 
movie. If that is the case then time appears as transformed space, and not as duration, 
since intellect can only work analytically, whereas duration can be experienced only 
intuitively.  
Within such a schema even a subjective perception like a close-up can only appear as 
a spatial shot. Again it was Griffith who used the close-up for the first time in the history 
of cinema. In his movie The Lonedale Operator (1911), Griffith especially uses the close-
up shot to emphasize the female character’s action. We see a close-up of a wrench as the 
female character tries to fool the other character as if it were a gun. By the insertion of 
close-up shots, subjectivity is reduced to the action of the subject instead of being 
experienced internally. The action of the subject is controlled by intellect and happens 
only as cause and effect. Thus, the insertion of a close-up enables the viewer to select 
what to perceive, or what is important to perceive within sensory-motor schema. This is 
not the only effect of the insertion of the close-up, but this is the way Griffith used it in 
his organic montage.  
Griffith’s organic montage is actually characterized with parallel cutting. Before 
Griffith, another American filmmaker, Edwin S. Porter, used the technique of parallel 
cutting in his film The Great Train Robbery (1903). In the movie, Porter used many 
techniques to reinforce the narrative, but parallel cutting was the most innovative one. It 
was through the use of this technique that, for the first time, the director was able to tell 
the story with parallel actions which happen at the same time but in different locations. 
Until then, cinema could only tell stories of people who share the same space. Parallel 
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cutting brings different locations within one time line, but also it enforces the unity of 
diversity to underline narration.  
Especially in Griffith’s movies there is a great organic unity of differentiated 
opposites, which appear as the organic unity of the whole, such as man and woman, poor 
and rich, country and town. He unites these diversities with parallel storylines and 
through them he creates the organic relation within shots. In parallel cutting the 
convergent actions do not only tend towards a single end, as the unity of diversity, but 
also as the unity of time. In fact in this kind of cinematic impulse time always stays as 
something objective to everyone and as one, single thing. If this occurs then montage 
reduces effect of the cinematographic-image and it offers the perception of space. It is 
because in such montage we conceive the fixed and defined perception of a character 
within a determined perception, time discloses as the unity of successive sections. It 
happens as the minimum unity of time or the absolute ‘gaze’ as the totality of time. If the 
structure of the cinematographic-image is covered by the unity of time due to its 
narrative, then the perception of time is being reduced to the perception of space, which 
gives the effect of time, but it does not represent time directly. Such cinematic impulse 
represents movement because what we experience is just the transformed space, like the 
early silent movies. Thus in Griffith’s organic montage, the image organically develops 
to the whole, as the unity of time but it cannot represent duration.  
Soviet filmmakers created their own montage technique as a critique of the American 
style, yet they also ended up with a conception of montage that serves as a tool to display 
the perception of space. In spite of vast ideological differences, Soviet dialectic montage 
has an organic nature very similar to that of American style. Russian film director and 
  88 
theorist Sergei Eisenstein conceptualized the idea of montage as a technique in 
accordance with dialectic dynamics. His inspiration was his mentor, Russian filmmaker 
and film theorist Lev Vladimirovich Kuleshov (1899-1970).  
Kuleshov is best known for his cinematic experiment in which shots of an actor were 
intercut with various random images in order to show how montage can change the 
viewer’s interpretation of the image. The idea is, if you put two images one after another, 
these two should conflict and create a third thing in the mind, which also should build a 
relation with the next coming image. Thus, according to Kuleshov, cinema consists of 
montage and juxtaposition of images. Eisenstein, after realizing the effects of juxtaposing 
cinematographic-images, followed Kuleshov’s footsteps but re-conceptualized the 
method in terms of ideological purposes and went on to invent dialectic cutting.  
In order to create dialectic form Eisenstein uses two opposite sides, but unlike 
Griffith, his opposite sides are not only different but also in conflict with each other. 
Eisenstein believes that there is always conflict in art; either with regard to its social 
mission, or with regard to its nature or methodology, conflict is fundamental for the 
existence of an art form. It can be set up as verbal utterance, in space, in physical 
movement, or by visual communication. In Eisenstein’s cinema, dialectic dynamics were 
embodied in conflict and it was reflected by the juxtaposition of images. Thus, in his 
dialectic cutting Eisenstein creates two parts which are opposed and in conflict with each 
other. He places parallel montage with the montage of opposition.  
Deleuze states that there are formal and absolute alterations, because what alters is 
not relative, it is rather formal. In Eisenstein’s montage we do not experience the image 
in progression, because transitions appear as a jump between shots instead of as an 
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organic link. As a result of that, change happens in terms of its quality as the 
development of a new dimension in consciousness. Such dialectic montage does not 
construct empirical reality, instead it constructs dialectic reality, which constantly 
produces itself and grows. If this is the case, then like making a literary argument, 
Eisenstein constantly argues a point by using images, because the image emphasizes an 
ideology instead of concentrating on its object’s reality. This happens in the intellect, as 
in Griffith’s organic montage. Therefore, since in dialectic montage the control is also in 
the intellect, shots are inevitably designed within the sensory-motor schema.  
We can see that at the beginning of cinema, montage shaped this cinematic impulse, 
or rather used as an important tool to reflect the underlying reality of the narrative. In the 
case of classical form the law of nature is what such an impulse is based. This classical 
approach to cinematic form is still alive and well. The contemporary mainstream film 
industry mostly produces films within this form. Even in film theories, this “classicist” 
impulse is deemed and employed as an analytical tool. For example, Cognitive Film 
Theory of 1990’s analyzes an image in accordance with the same principles. Cognitivists 
reflect the physiological and cognitive systems onto everything. They argue that all 
suggestions of the cinematographic-image (dimension, movement, depth, etc.) seem 
natural because they function according to the norms of human perception.  However, 
Cognitivists deny the psychoanalytic and structuralist semiotic film theories. Instead they 
focus on the cause and effect narrative and space-time relations. The reason they try to 
find meaning through the process of the intellect is because the same process of making 
sense is present in our everyday life experiences. This is basically the sensory-motor 
schema and in the end it is pure intellect that molds the cinematic experience. Such a 
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theory can be valuable only within the classical form, because it is the classical form that 
works within the sensory-motor links governing the operations of an isolated pure 
intellect.  
The classical form’s relation to intellect creates two problems. Such an impulse of 
cinema cannot communicate the origin of the cinematographic-image, which is duration. 
It is because as long as such films work within the law of nature, i.e. progress as cause 
and effect relations, they cannot create time as an alternative perception. If we think that 
the only causality can exist through the law of nature, as in sensory-motor linkage, then 
time that we experience can only be in cycling motion, as we have seen in Aristotle’s 
case. Thus such a time concept cannot have subjective relation to the viewer; instead it 
remains as an objective category, which relies on change. In this sense what we observe 
through the changes of the character has no connection to the real origin of the 
cinematographic-image, which is duration. As we have already mentioned in the previous 
chapter, real-time duration cannot be conveyed by the intellect or within the analytical 
process. As a result, in classical form of cinema we cannot have the metaphysical 
experience of duration, but rather experience the perception of space, via empirical 
expressions. In classical form as the spatial motion and empirical expression, action of 
the plot builds the narration.   
It follows that the classical form of cinema cannot convey the nature or the structure 
of the cinematographic-image either, because they revolve around duration. The sensory-
motor links of narration and montage cuts off the communication of the cinematographic-
image. As we have mentioned the cinematographic-image conveys time through 
everlasting cycling of signification. The object and the subject become one and beget a 
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new subjectivity as the alternative perception that the cinematographic-image offers. 
However in the classical form of cinema image is actualized through its determined links 
within the sensory-motor schema. Which means the subject objectively perceives the 
image as the perception of space. Thus in classical form of cinema the real artistic form, 
the cinematographic-image and its effect is restrained.  
This brings us to the second problem of the classical form’s engagement to intellect. 
If we think in terms of aesthetics and consider Kant’s theory, then we can say that such 
determination causes different judgment than aesthetic judgment, because intellect only 
works within cognitive process through determined cause and effect relations, whereas 
aesthetic judgment is neither determined nor empirical, it is pure affection.  Thus in 
classical form of cinema judgment is always cognitive and on the agreeable. If this is the 
case then such impulse of cinema is hardly an artistic practice or the art of 
cinematographic-image.  
Since the classical form cannot reveal duration as its origin, we cannot say that the 
origin of cinema is duration, unless the modern form is able to reveal duration as its 
origin and emphasizes the effect of the cinematographic-image. Therefore, in the next 
section we will investigate the modern form of cinema and see how the effect of the 
cinematographic-image and duration works in this form.  
3.3.2. Modern Form 
The modern form of cinema is neither necessarily experimental nor independent but 
rather it is a directorial cinema. If the film is designed within an objective law of nature, 
again we can only be left with an objective perception, which is the perception of space. 
On the other hand if we can encounter the director’s own subjective perception within a 
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movie, this will expand to another kind of subjectivity in which object and subject 
become one due to the heterogeneity of duration. In such modern form, it is not the plot 
or the character that forms the narration; instead it is the audio-visual image, i.e. the 
cinematographic-image.  
If we look back to Neo-Realism, French New-Wave or films of Tarkovsky we can see 
a perfect example of directorial cinema. Unlike commercial movies, directors of such 
films can easily be recognized:  
You will always recognize the editing of Bergman, Bresson, Kurosawa or Antonioni; 
none of them could ever be confused with anyone else, because each one’s perception 
of time, as expressed in the rhythm of his films, is always the same. On the other hand, 
if you take a few Hollywood films, you feel they were all edited by the same person.56  
Since the modern form does not create an objective point of view, it does not fully 
actualize the image. Rather as the virtual image, such films carry the marks of the 
director’s inner-world. The thing that stands out in this way of filmmaking is the virtual 
image and not the image that is actualized due to its narration and montage.  
Soviet film director and theorist Dziga Vertov criticizes Eisenstein for his narrative 
and accuses him to have the same bourgeois concerns with American filmmakers. Both 
cinematic impulses are constructed on narration in the same manner and thus in 
Eisenstein’s dialectic montage nature is still as organic as in Griffith’s. In fact Vertov 
rejects the human drama of old films because he finds them un-true to life:  
We declare the old films, based on the romance, theatrical films and the like, to be 
leprous. Keep away from them! . . . They are mortally dangerous! Contagious!57  
For Vertov, the plot has no importance, however, what is important is truth and fact, 
which are the forms of writing and a medium in cinema. Writing within the forms of truth 
and fact can only happen through the visuals (it should be noted that he made movies  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during the silent era); therefore Vertov creates the concept (or the character) of kino-eye 
and molds his films in regard to this concept.  
Our eye sees very poorly and very little… The movie camera was invented in order to 
penetrate deeper into the visible world, to explore and record visual phenomena.58  
He emphasizes the unreality of our empirical perception and proposes that the 
cinematographic-image should reflect reality, which is the opposite of the empirical one. 
According to Vertov, film camera can capture truth. His kino-eye captures such truth and 
facts, with the qualities of speed and machine. Vertov defines himself as the man with the 
moving camera and becomes the kino-eye:  
I am a kino-eye. I am a mechanical eye. I, a machine show you the world as only I can 
see it. …I free myself from human immobility. I am in constant motion.59  
It was neither realism nor narrative that Vertov was influenced by; he was interested 
in Futurism, and defining communism in accordance with such an impulse. It is true that 
Vertov defines this effect as a technical property, however, he actually finds the truth in 
the mechanical eye (the camera): not in terms of mere recording, but rather as revealing 
the truth of the image via such mechanism. In Vertov’s Man with a Movie-Camera 
(1929), we experience a comparison between life-as-it-is and life-in-the-film, but the 
relation is more likely created by the images’ own qualities rather than what is 
cognitively or semantically associated. There is a fine composition of images in this 
movie due to their own authenticity. He shows man present in nature, through his actions, 
his life, but within a mechanical progress of the non-human and superhuman dialectic. 
After such kinematic rendering, Vertov reaches truth with this dialectic method, i.e. the 
duration of an object.  
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Vertov’s rejection of human drama opens a path for the modern form, but it wasn’t 
cinematically realized until a few decades later. According to Deleuze, it is World War II, 
which causes a break in cinema:  
Why is the Second World War taken as a break? The fact is that, in Europe, the post-
war period has greatly increased the situations, which we no longer know how to react 
to, in spaces, which we no longer know how to describe. . . . Situations could be 
extremes, or, on the contrary, those of everyday banality, or both at once: what tends to 
collapse, or at least to lose its position, is the sensory-motor schema which constituted 
the action-image of the old cinema.60  
After this break, the linearity of cause-effect breaks down in cinema, and this 
cinematic impulse intends to make time and thought perceptible, by giving them visibility 
and sound. Instead of actualized image of classical form, here we experience the virtual 
image, which substantiates the narration of modern cinema.  
Italian Neo-Realism and French New-Wave are both results of this break. They both 
resemble the modern form. Neo-Realism was born in Italy to show the economic and 
moral conditions of regular people’s everyday life following World War II. Neo-Realistic 
style is characterized by filming on real location with the use of non-actors to tell stories 
of poverty and the struggle of working class people. It presents a new form of reality. 
Deleuze says that in Italian Neo-Realism, instead of representing the reality or the object 
of reality, the aim was to replace such reality or the object of reality. In such cinematic 
impulse, actual image cuts off from the sensory-motor schema and forms a circuit with its 
virtual image, because its objective reality is actually the most intimate reality of the 
object. The internal dynamics are emphasized via visual and sound images. They make 
what is internal perceptible without using a metaphor. Such internal dynamics appear as 
intuition rather than a determined, intellectual output. Therefore the image works outside                                                         
60 Deleuze, Gilles. Cinema 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The 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Tomlinson, Hugh & Galeta, Robert. London: Continuum International 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of the cause and effect relation. Regardless of classical realism’s distinction of real and 
imaginary, neo-realism breaks reality and passes to imaginary by the effect of the 
cinematographic-image. In Neo-Realism directors do not represent but re-write the reality 
as the higher degree of reality via audio-visual images. Therefore in Neo-Realism such 
objective reality of this image becomes the alternative perception of time. 
After Italian Neo-Realism, French New-Wave emerges. Rejecting classical cinematic 
form, French New-Wave aims for alienation, rather than reality. Through jump cuts, long 
tracking shots, sudden changes in the scene and shots which go beyond the common 180° 
axis, they propose the unreality of the reality, which the viewer lives in. In French New-
wave duration appears through false movement as false continuity. This resembles 
empirical perception’s illusion of movement and time. Thus false continuity with false 
movement actually refers to metaphysical motion and metaphysical alteration by 
emphasizing the deception of the empirical perception. With the false movement and the 
false continuity of French New-Wave, sensory-motor links (cause and effect relations) 
are interrupted and cinematic narrative is derived from images.  
Deleuze defines such impulse as critical objectivity and gives Godard’s films as the 
best example of this. In Goddard’s cinema, his critical objectivism turns into the most 
intimate subjectivism, which is actually reminiscent of Bergson’s concept of sympathy. 
According to Deleuze, Goddard’s critical objectivism, “in place of the real object, (…) 
put visual description, and made it go ‘inside’ the person or object.”61 It means that the 
object and the subject become intertwined. In this kind of cinema, the new subjectivity as 
the temporal subjectivity is only thing that is offered to the spectator as in the 
cinematographic-image.   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Narration of the classical form was already in the plot, because in such cinematic 
impulse, action of the plot builds the narration. However, in the modern form of cinema, 
narration is built through cinematographic-images. It is not only by linking the images to 
each other that the narrative is shaped, but also in the way such images communicated to 
the viewer. Thus through the cinematographic-image, the narration of the modern form of 
cinema is created in regard to its effect on the viewer. Therefore not only the empirical 
reality of the film, but also the metaphysical reality of the narration progresses within the 
viewer. Which means, in the modern form of cinema a viewer can have a metaphysical 
experience, which is the nature of duration, the origin of the cinematographic-image.  
Thus we can say that via image, it is duration, which shapes the narration in such films of 
the modern form.  
In his discussion of the modern form, Tarkovsky argues that traditional theatrical 
writing, which became the narration in cinema, links images through rigidly logical and 
linear development of the plot, meaning it is in accordance with the law of nature and 
cause-effect relations. He thinks that “poetic reasoning is closer to the laws by which 
thought develops, and thus to life itself, than is the logic of traditional drama”62. In fact, 
poetic links create associations, not only as a rational appraisal, but also intuitively. It is 
important to note that for Tarkovsky poetry is not a literary genre, but rather “is an 
awareness of the world, a particular way of relating to reality.”63 Naturalism as the 
explanation of the pattern of life can be poetic. In fact he considers cinema as the most 
realistic of arts. This is a different kind of reality, though. In cinema, image is the 
observation of subjectivity, thus cinema can only find its pure meaning within an internal                                                         
62 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Austin: 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2003. 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approach. For him, an image can represent one’s emotions on an object as an observation. 
Within that observation he finds layers of meaning. He argues that an image tries to reach 
to the infinite and to the absolute. It is a kind of a formulation, which defines the 
relationship between our mind, which is limited to space and truth, and the infinite. And 
that’s exactly ‘how time makes itself felt in a shot’:  
When you realize, quite consciously, that what you see in the frame is not limited to its 
visual depiction, but is a pointer to something stretching out beyond the frame and to 
infinity; a pointer to life.64 
To create such poetic logic within a film that can reach to the absolute, the director 
should concentrate on the objects’ own time (duration) and find its rhythm throughout the 
course of the shooting. According to Tarkovsky, the cinematographic-image comes into 
being during shooting. Organizing the process of editing, which is used in many art 
practices, gives the essential nature of the filmed material, but this is not what gives the 
film its rhythm. 
. . . every art form involves editing, in the sense of selection and collation, adjusting 
parts and pieces. The cinema image comes into being during shooting, and exists within 
the frame.65 
Tarkovsky argues that the rhythm of the film lies in the frame. In Tarkovsky’s 
cinema, the cinematographic-image represents image’s own time and this time-preserving 
image molds the story with its own rhythm. Rhythm of the film cannot be dependent on 
any law and it is made possible only by the director’s intuition. The quality lies within the 
rhythm of the image, because it is the dominant factor in the narration of the film. In fact 
we can effect by it even in a simple shot, without any editing. Which means, this 
dominant factor has to be within each cinematographic-image and must be considered 
from the shooting period. Where does this power of rhythm come from? For Tarkovsky,  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time is within the frame and reveals itself as the rhythm of the film, thus the power of 
rhythm comes from its direct representation of time:  
The distinctive time running through the shots makes the rhythm of the picture; and 
rhythm is determined not by the length of the edited pieces, but by the pressure of the 
time that runs through them.66  
He argues that even though there is no editing, no acting and no décor, the rhythm of 
the film will still be there, because time via movement will always exist within the frame.  
Tarkovsky with this unique insight into the nature of cinema defines time as the main 
element, which is prior to the creation of the work of the art of cinema. This is why he 
finds time as the unavoidable element of cinema and he thinks that via rhythm time 
manifests itself as subjective and as a spiritual category of the subject. 
Mirror reflects this intuitive process in many layers. In the end, however, what we 
encounter is the director’s uttermost subjectivity. In the film the mother-son relations 
actually refer to Motherland Russia. In many different ways his subjective relation to the 
concept of motherhood builds the dynamics of the images in the film and therefore it also 
shapes the narration of the film. Mirror successfully offers an alternative time perception 
through Tarkovsky’s sympathy towards his own self. He said many times that some of 
the scenes in the film were from his own memories about his mother and his mother also 
acts in the film. On the other hand, we cannot find any ego-pole in Mirror. In classical 
dramatic structure, the subject/protagonist is always an ego-pole and always moves under 
the force of the universe that is connected with his ego. In Mirror, the subject appears 
like a dream subject, in which the subject’s point of view transforms within personas.  
Another cinematic impulse of the modern form emerges in 1990’s with Dogme 95 
movement. Dogme 95 is in search of the virtual image, which, it claimed, was lost within  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the visual mechanics of the narrative. Big budget film productions already define the 
cinematographic qualities, but the movement of Dogme 95 opposes them. They aim to 
counterbalance the dynamics of big budget commercial movies. This is why they refuse 
to use any expensive, spectacular special effects and lighting. They set up some ground 
rules to concentrate on the story and the performance of the actors. Some of these rules 
are: filming must be done on real location, the camera should be hand-held, optical work 
and filters mustn’t be used, etc. In such movies, the cinematographic-image comes in 
very rough form, because of the conditions Dogme 95 requires. In a way the films of 
Dogme 95 are roughly done and filmed almost immaturely with poor knowledge of the 
technicality of filming. This roughness won’t let the visual component of the image 
actualize fully. Along with that the intensity of the characters and the story creates virtual 
image. Through the story and the conflict of the character, i.e. through his/her emotional 
states, which are impulsive, irrational, and therefore never in the rational form of cause-
effect relations, the virtual image arises. Since the visual component is never actualized 
and film is in intensive subjectivity, images in such films remain virtual. It is because of 
that in such films we encounter the real-time, duration.  
One of the founders of this movement was Danish film director Lars Von Trier 
(1956). The Dogme 95 movies of Lars Von Trier are perfect examples of how these films 
reveal the virtual image by purifying the filmmaking. Trier’s movie Dogville 
demonstrates how such a rough cinematographic-image can appear as the virtual image. 
In this movie Trier does not use any real space, instead he uses a minimalistic approach 
and physically draws the space, the whole set design and most of the props on stage. 
They all remain as mere suggestions. By using all kinds of material elements in minimal 
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scale, Trier reinforces the internal arc of the film through the acting and the story. By 
doing this, the image stays as the pure virtual image. The only thing that is represented as 
real is such virtuality, i.e. the temporal subjectivity of the image. Because a virtual image 
cannot be actualized the same way the present flows in the image, there is no 
determination but mere suggestions.  
In conclusion, we can say that modern form designates a kind of cinema where we 
encounter the director’s artistic statement. Modern form searches for virtual image and 
shapes the narration along and through it. In other words, in modern form the origin of 
the cinematographic-image, duration, is reflected throughout the whole film. As 
Tarkovsky argues, time is in the image no matter what, but by the juxtaposition of images 
this structure is either emphasized or restrained for the unity of time. If it is not 
emphasized then the effect of the cinematographic-image is reduced to the spatial 
perception of a shot, which is empirical and happens within the determined cause-effect 
relations. Thus the classical form cannot reflect the origin or the structure of the 
cinematographic-image as we have mentioned in the previous chapter.  If the structure of 
the cinematographic-image, which echoes the concept of duration, is present throughout 
the film, then aesthetic judgment about cinema seems possible. The modern form of 
cinema is this kind.  It is shaped by virtual images and it does not have any 
determination. It is a sign of a temporal perspective and it is about temporal subjectivity. 
Then we can also inquire whether time is the aesthetic value of cinema in regard to 
modern form. In the following chapter, we will try to demonstrate how duration 
manifests itself as the aesthetic value of the cinematographic-image and cinema, by 
defining the aesthetics of time.  
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4. AESTHETICS OF CINEMA 
 
 
“A new esthetic cocoon is broken; where will the butterfly’s wings carry him?”67 
Hugo Münsterberg 
 
 
If we try to understand what cinema is in terms of its contextual quality, we are left 
with the classical film analysis. Without questioning beautiful, the classical analysis of 
cinema tries to understand what the image tells us, or what the visual image means 
semantically. Since cinema is a form of art, it can only be understood by its aesthetics. 
Thus classical analysis of cinema does not help us to understand what cinema is nor does 
it help us to define the ideas of beauty in cinema. In fact, giving meaning to the image 
through already fixed structures such as linguistic semiology or psychoanalysis have 
nothing to do with aesthetic judgment in cinema, because they are cognitive judgments, 
and, as Kant points out, cognitive processes cannot create disinterested aesthetic 
judgment. Thus any contextual insight of the image or the script does not reveal beautiful 
either. If this is the case then, how does cinematic practice create beautiful and cause 
aesthetic judgment? 
The first aesthetic concept in the history of cinema was Photogenie. Even though this 
concept was used by many filmmakers and by many theorists in the silent era, there 
wasn’t a clear explanation or understanding of what Photogenie actually meant. Louis 
Delluc called it the “law of cinema”68. Jean Epstein called it the “purest expression of 
cinema”69.  
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Photogenie was thus that ineffable quintessence that differentiated the magic of cinema 
from the other arts. In another sense, the emphasis on the generation of new knowledge 
linked cinema to artistic modernism as a project of challenging conventional perception 
and understanding.70 
In the end this concept existed to try to define something in the cinematographic-
image that is unique but also un-definable. Deleuze believes that it was the aspect of 
movement that created such aesthetic definition:  
When Delluc, Germaine Dulac and Estepin, speak of ‘photogeny’, it is obviously not a 
question of the quality of the photo, but, on the contrary, of defining the 
cinematographic image in its difference from the photo. Photogeny is the image as it is 
‘majored’ be movement.71 
It was true that since the first movie there has always been a different kind of an 
artistic view within the moving picture than the rest of the visual arts, but regardless of 
that, ideas of beauty in cinema developed mostly as an extension of other art forms.  
Within cinematic practice, there are references to other art forms. It refers to 
photography, painting, architecture, music, theatre, etc. Ideas of beauty in today’s cinema 
find beautiful in relation to such art practices. To define the aesthetics of cinema and to 
find how beautiful is created in the work of the art of cinema first, we will explore the 
most common aesthetic qualities in it. In the end, these ideas of beauty transmit as 
cognitive judgments and since aesthetic judgment is non-cognitive and has to be pure, 
these common qualities cannot convey how beautiful is created in the work of the art of 
cinema. Then again how does beautiful occur in the work of the art of cinema?  
In the previous chapters we mentioned that if the art object is able to reflect its origin 
it can also be defined as beautiful. Then if time, as the origin, has the possibility to appear 
in the work of the art of cinema unintentionally, it also has the possibility to ground the 
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aesthetic judgment about it. If this is the case, then in cinema, beautiful should appear via 
time as well. Therefore in this chapter we will elucidate how time can be of aesthetic 
value, i.e. what is time aesthetics? In the end I will argue that the time aesthetics define 
the idea of beauty in cinema. 
4.1. Ideas of Beauty In Cinema 
Cinema, unlike any other art, has attracted and touched millions. However, if we 
consider cinema’s possibility of representing the most radical subjectivity, which is 
heterogeneous, it is not a shock. Regardless of such power of cinema, ideas of beauty are 
reduced to the relation of cinema with other arts. Especially photography and painting 
define the cinematographic quality. On the other hand dramatic structure, as its set in 
Aristotle’s Poetics, is still the backbone of today’s cinema. Within the general ideas of 
beauty in cinema, there are also technology and reality. The concept of reality is about 
capturing the reality as it is seen or being as real as the life is. Technological value, 
however, comes forward in relation to other qualities. Namely, technology becomes a 
vehicle again for any of these qualities to shine. In spite to that instrumental value of it, 
technology, as well as drama, cinematographic-quality and reality, is what today’s 
audience amazed by, values, and consumes. Then the question is, can beautiful be created 
within these general ideas of beauty in the work of the art of cinema?  
Drama or dramatic structure has been the centre of cinema since the silent era. This 
structure or the art of drama was born in Ancient Greece and represented an aesthetic 
value for theatre, but it also constitutes the backbone of cinema, even today. Dramatic 
structure begins with a life-altering incident for the protagonist, which Aristotle refers to 
as the change of fortune. With reversal of the situation and recognition of the hero, 
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his/her change of fortune occurs. In his book Poetics, Aristotle defines the essential 
element of drama, either within tragedy or comedy, as the plot.  
According to Aristotle’s description, plot is the imitation of actions, by the 
arrangement of incidents. A poet designs every second of his play by arranging the 
incidents in the predestined structure, which has to be within a three-act structure 
(beginning-middle-end) and dramatic unity. It should be one, single action that has 
structural parts and if one of them were taken out, the structure would fall apart, which 
means that they have to be organically connected. Aristotle also says that if the poet 
forces things to happen instead of looking at what the plot requires, like in the poem-
required recognition, that would be Deus ex Machina. In this dramatic structure, the gods 
enter the plot to bring the play to a close. Thus dramatic unity means that everything 
should be within the law of possibility or necessity, i.e. within cause and effect. Besides 
the plot, characters should also follow the law of possibility or necessity by talking and 
acting in accordance to it.  
In other words, Aristotle offers a schema for the characters and for the text. By 
connecting each part as cause and effect, the play is building to a cathartic point. The 
kind of dramatic structure Aristotle proposes or structures, through the character’s change 
of fortune, creates pity and fear on the audience. This means that Aristotle’s dramatic 
structure defines and forces a realization of right and wrong. With the force of fear and 
pity, the audience would be purified from their desire and reach catharsis.  
The defining key word today in cinema’s understanding of drama is dilemma. The 
character’s dilemma, which leads to the turning points of the plot, creates the dramatic 
structure. Therefore, we can say that for classical cinematic narration the principles 
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defined by Aristotle in Poetics are still valid. In the classical form of cinema within cause 
and effect relations, the main character has an arc of development and s/he changes 
through the incidents. This is the basic classical narrative, but the real dramatic structure 
builds by the incidents and the cathartic end. Thus, in such narrative, the plot is triggered 
with the turning point (change of fortune) and still in three-act structure (beginning-
middle-end).  
Taking the above into account, cinema becomes the last art of drama. This approach 
to narration constructs a kind of cinema in which the filmmaker plans beforehand what 
emotion or conclusion s/he will squeeze from the audience, and because of that narration 
appears within a determined agenda in classical cinema. The idea of demanding a specific 
emotion from a specific scene is similar to classical cinema’s organic montage, where 
every image is designed within the sensory-motor links. In this sense the problem is, 
since the plot or the screenplay is constructed upon a cause and effect relationship within 
a determined agenda, in regard to Kant’s theory of Aesthetic Judgment, such practice 
cannot result with an aesthetic judgment and cognitive judgment takes place. However, 
beautiful can only be reached through aesthetic judgment.  
According to Kant’s definition of beautiful and good work, such movies are judged as 
good work, because it gratifies us with its unity and dramatic effect. They can also be 
gratifying arguments, because instead of aesthetic judgment, we gain cognitive 
judgments due to following logically valid arguments of the plot or through its images. 
Such arguments are most likely to be morally correct, because with such moral ends the 
judgment would be on goodness as in good in itself. This is still the continuity of 
Aristotle’s concept of catharsis. Aristotelian concept of catharsis relies upon the definite 
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understanding of right and wrong. It is because of this that tragedies and comedies, which 
possess dramatic structure, can inspire fear and pity within the spectator. Either s/he feels 
the fear of being in the character’s place, or s/he pities the character because of what his 
actions have cost him. Through ethical codes, the audience agrees on the same lesson and 
thereon they would be purified from their desires and reach catharsis. Unlike dramatic 
structure, aesthetic judgment cannot produce either right or wrong. Therefore there 
cannot be any aesthetic judgment within catharsis. Instead, due to this cathartic end, one 
cannot reach aesthetic judgment, but rather gets to the judgment of the agreeable.  
Since cinema is an art form, when we feel satisfaction or dissatisfaction, this should 
be the result of an aesthetic judgment. If such contextual quality is not what makes the 
movie aesthetical, or cannot justify the beauty of a cinematographic-image then we 
should look for another aesthetic quality. One possibility is that the beautiful lies in the 
quality of the picture. It is true that especially after color is added to the cinematographic-
image, the art of cinematography in terms of light and colors, as in the photographic 
quality, becomes the most important idea of beauty in cinema. Big-budgeted spectacular 
studio movies are realized as the continuity of this idea of beauty. Good lighting, vivid 
colors, and clear pictures become mandatory unless otherwise required by the narration.  
There are two problems if cinematographic quality is the valid idea of beauty in 
cinema. One, the cinematographic-image is the composite of two components, sound and 
vision. If we take only one of them as the defining element, then we cannot actually 
conceive the art of the cinematographic-image. Two, the quality of the picture cannot 
create a singular and subjective judgment – unlike the medium of photography, where 
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light is the artistic form. It is because such cinematographic-quality defines the aesthetic 
value of the work only by reducing it to exemplary validity.  
Kant defines exemplary validity as the generalizing of singular judgment, which is an 
ideal norm. Since ideal is the representation that is adequate to the idea itself, it has the 
potential of turning into a rule for everyone. Such judgment can only be a cognitive one, 
because it occurs due to an example that is general and depends on the existence of the 
object. However, as we have seen in the previous chapters, an aesthetic judgment is a 
non-cognitive and pure judgment, which is disinterested. Disinterested judgment solely 
relies on the feeling of the object and not the existence of it. In terms of cinematographic-
quality, the value of the picture is determined due to former achievements in cinema in 
terms of lighting and color, or solely due to the art of photography. The world as we 
perceive it also can be the ideal norm which the picture tries to capture. This is similar to 
Kant’s example of the judgment on the rose. He says that if we say ‘roses are beautiful’ 
that would be a cognitive judgment, since I come to that conclusion by taking the 
knowledge of an aesthetic judgment as the ground for roses.  
If the filmmaker wants to create a picture as real as our empirical perception, reality 
and technology appear as other ideas of beauty in cinema. Today’s high-quality pictures 
impress the audience by how well the world is captured as close as possible to the way 
we experience it with the naked eye. In fact, in today’s filmmaking, technology actually 
tries to fulfill the craving for reality in cinema via the quality of the picture. In the search 
for reality, cinema invents new technologies, in order to record more clearly, more 
vividly and even in three dimensions. If this is the case, then the search for reality only 
takes place within human perception.  
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This way of representing reality has nothing to do with the real itself because human 
mind cannot perceive real-motion, real-time, or real-alteration, and so on. Thus, 
regardless of how equal the cinematographic-image is to our empirical perception, real is 
not within such perception. The definition of beautiful in cinema, regarding 
cinematographic-quality can only be referred to as exemplary validity, because it can only 
reflect the ideal norm. Therefore if the cinematographic-quality were defined by taking 
what is already there as beautiful or as reality as an example, this would be general and 
cognitive, whereas aesthetic judgment has to be singular, subjectively universal and 
immediate. In the end, technology (as we mentioned in the first chapter) is just a medium 
for the cinematographic-image to come to life and also for cinema to develop as a 
practice. However, what pleases us in cinema is never technical but rather aesthetic, in 
which technology can only be a medium.  
Other approaches to reality in cinema are through realistic storylines, dialogues, 
acting, etc. In this kind of cinema what marks the reality is our everyday life that is 
projected onto the screen. In such films the realism lies within the cause and effect 
relations of the plot and its ability to reflect an ordinary day. In this classical form, 
“reality” is determined by the empirical world again. Thus, whether with technology or 
without, the expression of the reality in cinema results with the judgment on the 
agreeable and never the beautiful, because the judgment is never pure or disinterested but 
is merely cognitive. In fact, according to Tarkovsky, films that are considered true-to-life 
are actually the ones that are un-realistically emphasized and overwritten:  
Of course such reproduction of real-life sensations is not an end in itself: but it can be 
given meaning aesthetically, and so become a medium for deep and serious thought.72                                                          
72 Tarkovsky, Andrey. Sculpting In Time. Hunter‐Blair, Kitty. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2003. p. 23 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Therefore the cinematographic-image’s loyalty is not towards the reality of the 
empirical world, but rather to the reality of one’s subjectivity. Neither with the help of 
technology nor with realistic acting, set design or a plot, the film does not necessarily 
represent reality. Reality, if aimed at, is transmitted to the viewer, but it cannot be 
reproduced. As Deleuze points out in his analysis of Neo-Realism,  
. . . real was no longer represented or reproduced but aimed at.73  
This takes place within modern forms of cinema, where the narrative is constructed 
via audio-visual images, rather then the causal relations of the plot. In this case, cinema 
offers an alternative perception in which reality appears as a continuum and builds on the 
reality of the inner world that is apart from the empirical perception. Thus, reality 
actually does not appear as a mere aesthetic value but as the articulation of the temporal 
subjectivity.  
In conclusion we can say that the pure aesthetic value of cinema cannot be the 
photographic quality or the successful expression of drama. It does not matter whether 
the movie aims for reality or for the magical. Those films in which reality is represented 
by its photographic quality or by its dramatic effect do not necessarily result in an 
aesthetic judgment. This is because they do not leave enough space for the viewer to have 
free play of imagination as the picture moves. Neither the screenplay, which is the 
context of the movie and forces the viewer to feel a definite feeling with its determined 
agenda, nor the cinematographic quality, which is an exemplary validity, can create the 
aesthetic value. Kant suggests that all judgments of beauty about fine arts, those that are 
valued through the cultural codes, are judgments of dependent beauty. If this is the case 
                                                        
73 Deleuze, Gilles. Cinema 2: The Time‐Image. Tomlinson, Hugh & Galeta, Robert. London: Continuum International 
Publishing, 2005. p. 1 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then all the general ideas of beauty in cinema are dependent because they all work on 
some cultural codes, and engage with an interest of some kind. Thus they work 
cognitively.  In such manners, the object is judged as beautiful because it belongs to 
either this or that and therefore fails to be pure. In the end, we cannot argue that such 
films are ugly; however we can say that the judgment on such works cannot be an 
aesthetic one. Through the deciphering of the screenplay or with the quality of the 
picture, we can only have a judgment of the agreeable, and never of the beautiful. As a 
result, today’s filmmaking, which is dominated by Hollywood, produces films, which 
obey what has already been presented to them as beautiful, and constantly repeats the 
same aesthetic ideas of beauty only by slightly adjusting them to new technologies and to 
new social structures.  
It seems that general ideas of beauty in cinema are not aesthetically valid. In such 
empirically determined compositions, can there still be a place for aesthetic judgment? 
Such possibility has to manifest itself in its smallest unit, in the cinematographic-image. 
We have already said that the origin of art is in connection to its aesthetic value and it is 
what makes the work purposive. If this is the case, then to have the judgment of beautiful 
in cinema we need to elucidate time and the cinematographic-image one more time. Thus 
we will look at whether time is reflected in the cinematographic-image as its aesthetic 
value or not.  
4.2. Cinema: Aesthetics of Time  
Tarkovsky asserts that “time becomes the very foundation of cinema: as sound is in 
music, color in painting, character in drama”74. We have already proposed that time is the 
origin of cinema, but how does time become an aesthetic value? In order to understand                                                         
74 Tarkovsky, Andrey. Sculpting In Time. Hunter‐Blair, Kitty. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2003. p. 119 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this, we need to go back to Kant’s aesthetic theory, since we said that his definition of 
beautiful is our axiom. His understanding of beauty is a subjective priori. Such 
subjectivity does not mean that the senses of the subject are affected, it denotes how the 
subject can discover the object’s beauty and relate to it as the free play of imagination 
through feelings. This free play of imagination is the condition of an aesthetic experience. 
However, even if the free play occurs for everyone, since there is no rule to define it, 
such an act of imagination cannot be understood analytically. In this sense Kant’s 
aesthetic judgment happens rather by going into the object intuitively and beautiful 
appears as an immediate and automatic reflection.  
In Kant’s theory, aesthetic judgment is the center of aesthetic philosophy and 
judgment of taste is the ground of aesthetic judgment. Judgment of taste is the judgment 
on the object’s representation to our feelings by satisfaction or dissatisfaction. This 
subjective judgment happens as a mere intuition and reflection. On the other hand, it is 
also universally valid, i.e. everyone who has a good taste ought to have the same 
judgment. If we don’t judge the aesthetic value of the object through the judgment of 
taste, then it means we use our faculty of desire.  
Faculty of desire meets with satisfaction or dissatisfaction not by the representation of 
the object, but rather by its existence, thus it is bound up with interest. Then the judgment 
we have would be cognitive. In this case we can claim the object as pleasant or as good 
either as good in itself, i.e. morally good, or as good for something else or as good for 
oneself, but not as beautiful. Namely the pleasure would be in the agreeable. Unlike these 
kinds of pleasures that please our senses, pleasure in beauty is disinterested. Such 
pleasure does not engaged with desire in any way; it is neither based on desire nor does it 
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produce desire. This disinterested aesthetic judgment happens as the immediate affection. 
Thus Kant’s aesthetic judgment requires two basic conditions: disinterestedness and 
immediacy.  
For Kant, beautiful is what pleases us immediately without any concept or purpose as 
the free play of imagination. This immediacy comes as the result of disinterested 
judgment. If the judgment of taste on the reflection of the object is of an aesthetic kind 
and not cognitive, then the subject’s relation to the object cannot be defined with an 
analytic approach. If it is an intuitive phenomenon, the communication between the 
subject and the object should happen as the pure sympathy, by the immediate givenness 
of the object. Givenness of the object means having the specific quality beyond any 
question or doubt. Such quality can be found in the object’s underlying nature and reality. 
If it is the case, then the immediate givenness of the object is related to the metaphysical 
origin of it. It is this immediate givenness of the object that discloses the beautiful 
through the free play of imagination.  
In accordance with what is said above, if in cinema the origin is time then the 
immediate givenness of the work of the art of cinema has to be time as well. Beautiful 
should happen if a movie can transmit its origin through its artistic form, the 
cinematographic-image. Namely, the reflective judgment happens, which is particular to 
universal, if the work of art is able to reflect such origin without meeting with interest. If 
this is the case, then it is the origin of the cinematographic-image that makes the 
judgment of the work purposive: the origin does not relate to any interest or desire, rather 
it relates to everyone beyond them. If a movie’s use of time, which is the origin, is 
expressed in a way that the work can build upon it, due to our good taste we ought to 
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experience beautiful. If this is the case, then how does time manifest itself as an aesthetic 
value?  
Tarkovsky says that man who simultaneously reproduces time on screen, often also 
has “acquired a matrix for actual time”75. As we have seen in the previous chapters, the 
cinematographic-image is the variable present. The structure of the cinematographic-
image, the triad-sign functioning, causes an everlasting cycling of interpretation. In the 
cinematographic-image, time as the temporal subjectivity is in such everlasting motion. It 
is not only because time as duration is always in flux, but also because of the structure of 
the cinematographic-image such everlasting motion occurs.  
Tarkovsky points out that even the most ordinary cinematographic-image has the 
chance to be singular, because its referent comes within the image itself. This is different 
than montage’s power of relationality. Because, with montage, relationality still creates 
itself by depending on the logic of cause and effect linearity. The singular syntax of the 
cinematographic-image, i.e. the variable present, as an intuitive process, appears as the 
immediate givenness, in each and every cinematographic-image. The spectator without 
any interest immediately encounters with the temporal subjectivity of an alternative 
perception within a continuum. In the end, through the everlasting cycling of 
interpretation, as it is the free play of imagination, aesthetic judgment realizes along with 
all the suggestion of the cinematographic-image, without any rule but in a rule-governed 
way.  
The perception of the camera becomes the perception of the subject. The object and 
the subject intertwine and this produces a different kind of heterogeneous subjectivity. 
That’s why the cinematographic-image appears in hyper-reality and creates an alternative                                                         
75 Ibid., p. 62 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perception, in which time is re-created as the immediate reflection of the variable present. 
Without any concept or purpose an immediate expression of time causes the free play of 
imagination by its triad sign functioning, while re-defining our subjectivity. We 
experience the cinematographic-image as a metaphysical phenomenon and the free play 
of imagination comes intuitively. The cinematographic-image reflects a representation of 
such time perception to our feelings and meets with satisfaction or dissatisfaction of 
positive pleasure. Thus, it is the singular syntax of the cinematographic-image’s triad sign 
functioning structure that pleases us immediately in the moving picture.  
The cinematographic-image, by its nature, is actualized within motion and 
continuum. However, this empirical perception is not the real effect of the image, but 
both motion and continuum of the visible and sound actually communicates real time, 
duration. Especially due to its continuous (empirical) motion, the cinematographic-image 
has the possibility of creating the uttermost immediate reflective judgment. Since the 
image always processes in the period of time, it creates the cycling interpretation, without 
intention yet inescapable. This effect of the cinematographic-image has the quality of 
purposiveness. Within Kant’s aesthetic theory beauty is in the form of purposiveness. It 
means that the object reflects an end, even though does not intend to have any purpose.  
Spatialized image, with the participation of the viewer, re-temporalizes the image without 
any interest and as the immediate reflection.   
Judgments on goodness or pleasantness presuppose an end or purpose, which the 
object has to satisfy. In the case of cinema, judgments on photographic quality or the 
dramatic effect of a movie presuppose such an end; cinema tries to satisfy these 
expectations. Its technical nature, which is being in continuous motion, is the medium for 
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this end. On the other hand, time appears in such an image as the causality of the concept 
in respect of its object. It is the purposiveness of the judgment on duration of the 
cinematographic-image that causes beautiful to be realized. This disinterested judgment, 
since it is all about feelings, happens to be pure and we experience free beauty. On the 
other hand, judgments on the photographic quality or the dramatic effect of the plot in 
cinema fail to be pure. Then if time, as duration, is the aesthetic value of the 
cinematographic-image, we need to find out if it is the same for the work of the art of 
cinema. 
Cinema is the practice of signs and images, but since it is also an art form, this 
practice should at the same time yield an aesthetic judgment. We have seen that the 
cinematographic-image by its nature offers an alternative time perception. This nature of 
the cinematographic-image manifests itself in its metaphysical and ontological 
statements. What is important is whether these statements have analytic ends or intuitive 
ends. While the first one produces a cognitive judgment, the latter one produces an 
aesthetic judgment. In fact, when we investigate the cinematic impulses in regard to its 
origin we see that juxtaposition of images respond in two ways. Either it emphasizes the 
structure and creates virtual images, or it moves them towards the whole as the unity of 
time and creates actual images, which dismisses the real effect of the cinematographic-
image.  
The triad sign functioning of the cinematographic-image is still present both in 
classical form and modern form. However, this cycling of interpretation does not 
necessarily occur as the free play of imagination in classical form, which reduces the 
effect of time as an aesthetic value, due to montage’s sensory-motor linkage. The 
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judgment on such films is always related to the agreeable, and never to the beautiful, i.e. 
it happens as a cognitive appraisal. The modern form, as we mentioned in the previous 
chapter, relies on the communication of the cinematographic-image, because via such 
images the narrative is shaped. Therefore cinema still has the possibility of reflecting time 
as its own aesthetic form, since it is the origin of the cinematographic-image. This 
possibility can only be real if the work can manifest that the art of cinema is the art of the 
cinematographic-image. Such a form of cinema, which shapes its narrative through the 
cinematographic-image, presupposes time as its aesthetic value by re-claiming the 
duration of such an image and freeing the imagination of the image’s reflection.  
The reason is because this kind of cinematic impulse does not aim for analytical end 
in the movie. Relation of the images defines the sensational subjectivity of the film and 
they are formed by the participation of the spectator. In such an understanding of cinema, 
the spectator does not follow the causal links, but rather follows the duration of the image 
along with his/her own duration. Therefore, the cycling interpretation of images happens 
intuitively as the free play of imagination and ends with an aesthetic judgment. In this 
case, it concludes that the aesthetics of cinema is the aesthetics of time.  
When the Lumiére Brothers showed The Arrival of a Train at the Station to their first 
audience, the crowd got scared and they tried to run away from the train. Being able to 
capture past movement was unthinkable for them at the time, but with cinema they were 
able to. Time within the moving picture came as the immediate perception of the 
universe, and resulted with an intuitive, aesthetic judgment. Therefore, intentionally or 
not, in The Arrival of a Train at the Station, the Lumiére Brothers opened up a new 
aesthetic cocoon: aesthetics of time.  
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